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Survivor Funds 
 
Jonathan Barry Forman1 & Michael J. Sabin2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article explains how to create “survivor funds”—short-
term investment funds that would pay more to those investors 
who live until the end of the fund’s term than to those who die 
before then.  For example, instead of just investing in a ten-year 
bond and dividing the proceeds among the investors at the end 
of the bond term, a survivor fund would invest in that ten-year 
bond but divide the proceeds only among those who survived the 
full ten years.  These survivor funds would be attractive 
investments because the survivors would get a greater return on 
their investments, while the decedents, for obvious reasons, 
would not care. 
Survivor funds would work like short-term tontines.  
Basically, a tontine is a financial product that combines 
features of an annuity and a lottery.  In a simple tontine, a 
group of investors pools their money together to buy a portfolio 
of investments, and, as investors die, their shares are forfeited, 
often with the entire fund going to the last survivor.  For 
example, imagine that ten 65-year-old men each contribute 
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$1000 to a fund that buys a large diamond for $10,000 and that 
the men agree that the last “survivor will get the diamond.  
Accordingly, after the ninth man dies, the tenth man gets the 
diamond, and he can keep it or sell it. 
Of course, the survivor principle—that the share of each, at 
death, is enjoyed by the survivors—can be used to design 
financial products that would benefit multiple survivors, not 
just the last survivor.  For example, elsewhere, we showed how 
tontines could be used to create so-called “tontine annuities” and 
“tontine pensions” that would benefit lots of retirees.  In this 
Article, we show how the survivor principle can be used to create 
survivor funds that would only make payments to those who 
survive for a specified number of years.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Steve and Mark are camping when a bear suddenly comes 
out and growls.  Steve starts putting on his tennis shoes.  Mark 
says, ‘What are you doing?  You can’t outrun a bear!’  Steve 
says, ‘I don’t have to outrun the bear—I just have to outrun 
you!’”3  
This Article explains how to create survivor funds—short-
term investment funds that would pay more to those investors 
who live until the end of the fund’s term than to those who die 
before then.  For example, instead of just investing in a ten-
year zero coupon bond4 and dividing the proceeds among the 
 
3.  You Can’t Outrun a Bear, BOYS’ LIFE, 
http://boyslife.org/jokes/6953/you-cant-outrun-a-bear/ (last visited Oct. 30, 
2016).   
4.  Zero Coupon Bonds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., (Mar. 29, 2010), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/zero.htm (“Zero coupon bonds are bonds that do 
not pay interest during the life of the bonds. Instead, investors buy zero 
coupon bonds at a deep discount from their face value, which is the amount a 
bond will be worth when it “matures” or comes due. When a zero coupon bond 
matures, the investor will receive one lump sum equal to the initial 
investment plus the imputed interest . . .”).  Historically, bonds were issued 
in the form of bearer certificates, with interest coupons printed on the 
certificate.  See, e.g., Coupon Bond, INVESTINGANSWERS, 
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/bonds/coupon-bond-
1039 (last visited Oct. 30, 2016).  As each interest payment came due, the 
bearer would detach (“clip”) the coupon and exchange it for the interest 
payment.  Id.  
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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investors at the end of the bond term, a survivor fund would 
invest in that ten-year zero coupon bond but divide the 
proceeds only among those who survived the full ten years.  
These survivor funds would be attractive investments because 
the survivors would get a greater return on their investments, 
while the decedents, for obvious reasons, would not care. 
Survivor funds would work like short-term tontines.5  
Basically, “[a] tontine is a financial product that combines the 
features of an annuity and a lottery.”6  “In a simple tontine, a 
group of investors pool their money together to buy a portfolio 
of investments and, as investors die, their shares are forfeited, 
with the entire fund going to the last surviving investor.”7  “For 
example, in an episode of the popular television series 
M*A*S*H, Colonel Sherman T. Potter, as the last survivor of 
his World War I unit, got to open the bottle of cognac that he 
and his buddies brought (and share it with his Korean War 
compatriots).”8  Similarly, in the reality television show 
Survivor, contestants are stranded in a remote location, and 
the last “survivor” gets a million-dollar prize.9 
Of course, the survivor principle—”that the share of each, 
at his death, is enjoyed by the survivors”10—can be used to 
design a variety of financial products that would benefit 
multiple survivors, not just the last survivor.  In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, many 
European governments used multi-beneficiary tontines to raise 
 
5.  Tontines are named after Lorenzo de Tonti, the seventeenth century 
Italian banker who came up with the idea.  See, e.g., MOSHE A. MILEVSKY, 
KING WILLIAM’S TONTINE: WHY THE RETIREMENT ANNUITY OF THE FUTURE 
SHOULD RESEMBLE ITS PAST 42 (2015).   
6.  Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions, 163 
U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757 (2015) [hereinafter Forman & Sabin, Tontine 
Pensions].  “An annuity is a financial instrument (e.g., an insurance contract) 
that converts a lump sum of money into a stream of income payable over a 
period of years, typically for life. The person holding an annuity is called an 
annuitant.”  Id. at 757 n.1. 
7.  Id. at 757. 
8.  Id. (referring to M*A*S*H: Old Soldiers (CBS television broadcast 
Jan. 21, 1980)).  
9.  Survivor (TV Series 2000-), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0239195/ 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
10.  Tontine, WORDNIK, https://www.wordnik.com/words/tontine (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2016).  
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money.11  Similarly, elsewhere, we have described how tontines 
could be used to create so-called tontine annuities and tontine 
pensions that would benefit lots of retirees.12 
In this Article, we show how the survivor principle can be 
used to create survivor funds that would only make payments 
to those who survive for a specified number of years.  We 
believe that many investors would be attracted to these 
survivor funds.  These are people who want the higher returns 
that survivors could get with survivor funds and who would be 
willing to accept the losses that they would incur if they died 
before the survivor-fund term ended.  In short, we believe that 
there would be a demand for short-term survivor funds, and 
given that demand, there would be companies that want to 
offer them. 
Indeed, we believe that many investors would be attracted 
to survivor funds, and this Article explains how those survivor 
funds would work.  At the outset, Part I of this Article 
discusses the individual-cohort method for reallocating the 
balances in the accounts of those who die before the survivor-
fund term ends.  Part II explains the date-aligned method for 
reallocating those account balances.  Part III discusses the 
difficulty of selecting the correct mortality table for a survivor 
fund to use (when one is needed), and Part IV shows how the 
age-aligned method for reallocating account balances losses can 
avoid that difficulty.  Finally, Part V shows that survivor funds 
could work with all types of investments, and Part VI discusses 
how to resolve some of the technical problems that would arise 
with survivor funds. 
 
  
 
11.  See, e.g., MILEVSKY, supra note 5; ROBERT W. COOPER, AN HISTORICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE TONTINE PRINCIPLE (1972); Kent McKeever, A Short History 
of Tontines, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 491 (2009). 
12.  See Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 790-801 
(tontine annuities), 802-07 (tontine pensions); Michael J. Sabin, Fair Tontine 
Annuity (Mar. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1579932 [hereinafter Sabin, Fair Tontine Annuity]. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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I. A SIMPLE SURVIVOR FUND: THE INDIVIDUAL-
COHORT METHOD 
 
A. Longevity Risk, Annuities, and Bonds 
 
“Longevity risk—the risk of outliving one’s retirement 
savings—is probably the greatest risk facing current and 
future retirees.”13  Individuals use a variety of approaches to 
“hedge” against living too long.  Traditional lifetime annuities 
offer a particularly good way for individuals to generate income 
throughout their retirement years.  For example, for a 65-year-
old man who purchased a $100,000 immediate, level-payment 
annuity without inflation protection as of December 1, 2015, 
the annual payment would be around $6540 (6.54% of the 
annuity’s purchase price.14 
Of course, people rarely choose to buy annuities 
voluntarily.15  Even if they have no particular desire to leave 
assets to their heirs,16 many investors just hate the idea that 
 
13.  Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 761.  See, e.g., 
Youngkyun Park, Retirement Income Adequacy With Immediate and 
Longevity Annuities, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF, No. 357, May 2011, 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_05-2011_No357_Annuities.pdf; 
Common Retirement Risks, AMERIPRISE FIN., 
https://www.ameriprise.com/retirement/retirement-planning/common-
retirement-risks/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
14.  See Immediate Annuities Update, ANNUITY SHOPPER BUYER’S GUIDE, 
Jan. 2016, at 8, 17 tbl.5,  
 https://www.immediateannuities.com/pdfs/as/annuity-shopper-2016-01.pdf 
(showing average payments to a 65-year-old man of $545 per month, $6540 
per year).  Because women tend to live longer than men, the annual 
payments for a 65-year-old woman who elected an immediate, level-payment 
annuity as of December 1, 2015 would be only $6132, or 6.13% of the 
annuity’s purchase price (showing an average payment to 65-year-old woman 
of $511 per month).  Id.  Inflation-adjusted annuities offer an even better way 
to hedge against living too long.  With inflation-adjusted annuities, annual 
payments would start out lower than level-payment annuities, but could end 
up higher.  For example, if the hypothetical 65-year-old man in the last 
paragraph instead chose an annuity stream with a 3% annual escalator, the 
initial annual payment would be just $4728, but, eventually, the annual 
payments would exceed the $6540 per year fixed under the level-payment life 
annuity.  Id. (showing average monthly payments to 65-year-old men with a 
3%-cost-of-living adjustment of $394 per month in the first year of his 
retirement [$4728 in the first year]). 
15.  Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 800.  
16.  Economists call this a bequest motive.  See, e.g., Bequest Motive, 
5
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an early death seems to benefit the insurance company. 
Instead, many investors prefer to invest in stocks and 
bonds.  Pertinent here, many investors buy bonds.  While bonds 
can often be sold without penalty before they mature, many 
investors—especially retired investors—hold their bonds until 
maturity, and then they either reinvest or spend the proceeds 
as needed.  In order to minimize interest-rate risk and increase 
liquidity, it can make sense to create a “laddered bond” 
portfolio where the bonds’ maturity dates are evenly spaced 
over several years so that bonds are maturing and being 
reinvested at regular intervals.17  For example, rather than 
buying just one bond worth $100,000 that matures in ten years, 
a retiree might buy ten bonds worth $10,000 each that were 
laddered so that one bond matured in each of the next ten 
years. 
All in all, there is a large demand for bonds,18 and there is 
relatively little demand for lifetime annuities.19  That is where 
 
ANNUITY DIGEST, http://www.annuitydigest.com/bequest-motive/definition 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2016).  People with a “bequest motive” value the prospect 
of leaving wealth to family, friends, or good causes.  See, e.g., Lee M. 
Lockwood, Bequest Motives and the Annuity Puzzle, AMER. RISK & INS. ASSOC. 
(Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://www.aria.org/meetings/2011%20papers/Bequest%20Motives%20and%2
0the%20Annuity%20Puzzle.pdf.  
17.  See, e.g., How and Why to Build a Bond Ladder, FIDELITY (Nov. 24, 
2015), https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/bond-ladder-strategy. 
18.  For example, in 2014, there was $39,034 billion in outstanding U.S. 
bond market debt. US Bond Market Outstanding tbl. 2.1 (Outstanding U.S. 
Bond Market Debt, last updated Dec. 23, 2015) SIFMA (last visited Jan. 15, 
2016), 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/CM-
US-Bond-Market-SIFMA.xls?n=27525.  Also, in 2015, $6,436.9 billion in new 
U.S. bonds were issued.  US Bond Market Issuance, Monthly tbl. 1.1 
(Issuance in the U.S. Bond Markets, last updated Jan. 14, 2015) SIFMA (last 
visited Jan.15, 2016), 
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/CM-
US-Bond-Market-SIFMA.xls?n=27525. 
19.  In 2014, just $229.4 billion of annuities were sold in the U.S.  IRI 
Issues Fourth-Quarter and Year-End 2014 Annuity Sales Report, INSURED 
RET. INST. (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.irionline.org/research/research-detail-
view/iri-issues-fourth-quarter-and-year-end-2014-annuity-sales-report.  On 
the relatively low demand for annuities, see, e.g., Shlomo Benartzi, 
Alessandro Previtero & Richard H. Thaler, Annuitization Puzzles, 25 J.  
ECON. PERSP. 143 (2011); Franco Modigliani, Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, 
and the Wealth of Nations, 76 AM. ECON. REV.  297 (1986); Menahem E. Yaari, 
Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer, 32 REV. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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survivor funds come in.  As more fully described below, with a 
survivor fund, the investor would get a higher rate of return 
than she would get with a regular bond—as long she is willing 
to lose her investment if she does not survive until the survivor 
fund matures.  As with regular bonds, an investor could hold a 
single survivor fund or a laddered portfolio of survivor funds.  
At bottom, with a survivor fund, an investor could take on some 
modest mortality risk over the short term of the survivor fund, 
as opposed to the lifetime mortality risk that comes from 
investing in a lifetime annuity.20 
 
B. The Survivor Principle and a Simple Survivor 
Fund 
 
In a simple tontine, investors “contribute equally to buy a 
portfolio of investments that is awarded entirely to the last 
surviving member[;] [a]lternatively, each time a member of a 
tontine pool dies, her account balance could be divided among 
the surviving [investors].”21  “The key point is that variations 
on the [survivor] principle—that the share of each, at death, is 
enjoyed by the survivors—can be used to create a variety of 
attractive” financial products, including survivor funds.22 
 
1. A Simple Zero Coupon Bond 
 
At the outset, imagine that 1000 otherwise identical 65-
year-old men each contribute $1000 to an investment fund that 
invests $1,000,000 in 10-year zero coupon bonds, each with a 
5% yield to maturity.  At maturity in ten years, those bonds 
would have a maturity value of $1,628,894.63,23 and, at the end 
 
ECON. STUD. 137 (1965).  
20.  Here, we use the term “mortality risk” to refer to the risk that an 
investor will lose all or a portion of her investment because of death.  There is 
relatively little risk that an investor will lose her investment over the short-
term of a survivor fund.  On the other hand, when an investor buys a lifetime 
annuity, she has a fairly high probability of dying before she has fully 
recovered her initial investment.  See infra note 27 and accompanying text 
(explaining mortality gains and losses).  
21.  Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 774.  
22.  Id.  
23.  See, e.g., Zero Coupon Bond Yield Calculator, FINANCE FORMULAS, 
7
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of the 10-year period, each investor (or his heirs) would get 
around $1629 on his $1000 investment.24 
 
2. A Simple Survivor Fund Using the Individual-
Cohort Method 
 
Now imagine that we instead divide that $1,628,894.63, 
but only among the men who survived those ten years.  For 
example, suppose that only 800 of our original group of 1000 
men survived ten years to age 75.25  Then, each survivor would 
get around $2036,26 while those who died during the term of 
this survivor fund would lose their investments.  That is, the 
“winners” who survived all ten years would have mortality 
gains of around $407,27 while the “losers” who died during the 
10-year period would have mortality losses of around $1629.28  
In short, some “outran” the bear, and some got eaten.29 
For the survivors, it is as if they earned a yield to maturity 
of around 7.37% on this survivor-fund investment rather than 
 
http://www.financeformulas.net/Zero-Coupon-Bond-Effective-
Yield.html#Calc-Header (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).  $1,628,894.63 = 
$1,000,000 × (1.00 + 0.05).   
24.  $1628.89 = $1,628,894.63/1000.  In this Article, computations 
involving money are usually rounded to the nearest penny, and many other 
computations are rounded to two digits after the decimal point. 
25.  At this point in the Article, suffice it to say that 20% is a very 
reasonable mortality rate, but see Part III, infra, for a discussion about what 
mortality tables are appropriate for survivor funds. 
26.  $2036.12 = $1,628,894.63/800. 
27.  $407.23 = $2036.12– $1628.89.  “Individuals who invest in annuity-
like products have mortality gains and losses depending on when they die.  
Individuals who live longer than their peers get mortality gains from those 
who precede them, while individuals who die earlier than their peers suffer 
mortality losses.”  Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 776 
n.105 (citing David Blake, Annuity Markets: Problems and Solutions, 24 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 358, 371 (1999) (explaining that a mortality 
cross-subsidy “arises because some annuitants will die shortly after taking 
out an annuity thereby releasing a ‘mortality profit’ which insurance 
companies share with longer-surviving annuitants . . . “).  In the specific case 
of a survivor fund, individuals who survive to the end of the period get 
mortality gains from those who died during the period. 
28.  Regardless of when a loser dies, the amount he loses is $1628.89, 
the final value of his investment. 
29.  See supra note 3. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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just the 5% earned on the underlying zero coupon bond.30  That 
is, the survivors would get a 2.37% higher yield to maturity.31  
Put differently, the yield to maturity for this survivor fund32 
would be 47% higher than the yield to maturity on the 
underlying zero coupon bonds.33 
The survivors cannot possibly do worse investing in this 
survivor fund than they would by holding the underlying zero 
coupon bonds directly;34 and the more investors that die, the 
better the survivors would do.  In short, assuming that they 
survive, investors in a survivor fund have nothing to lose and 
everything to gain.  For an investor with no “bequest motive”35 
(e.g., no heirs) who currently buys and holds short-term bonds, 
buying a short-term survivor fund, instead, would make a lot of 
sense.36 
We call the simple method that we used to create the 
hypothetical 65-year-old-man survivor fund above the 
“individual-cohort method.”  A cohort is defined as a group of 
people who are the same age37 (and, perhaps, the same gender, 
i.e., 65-year-old men).  Theoretically, an investment company 
wishing to offer survivor funds could simply create a separate 
survivor fund for each and every cohort, just as we did for the 
65-year-old-male cohort above. 
 
30.  7.36935% = ($2036.12/$1000.00)0.1– 1. 
31.  2.37% = 7.37% – 5.00%. 
32.  As this survivor fund is invested entirely in zero coupon bonds, we 
could call it a “survivor bond” instead. 
33.  47.4% = (7.37% – 5.00%)/5.00%.  Put differently, the survivors get 
25% more from the survivor fund than from the underlying 5% zero coupon 
bonds.  1.25 = $2036.12/$1628.89. See also Jonathan Barry Forman & 
Michael J. Sabin, Using Survivor Funds to Boost 401(k) returns, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS (June 27, 2016, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20160627/ONLINE/160629917/using-
survivor-funds-to-boost-401k-returns. 
34.  If, miraculously, none of the investors died during the 10-year bond 
period, all of the investors would get the 5.00% yield to maturity on the 
underlying zero coupon bonds. 
35.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
36.  Almost all of the survivor fund examples in this Article refer to 10-
year investment periods, and we refer to these investments as “short-term.”  
Of course, the same principles could be used to create survivor funds with 
longer or shorter durations. 
37.  Cohort, VOCUBULARY.COM, 
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/cohort (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).  
9
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These individual-cohort survivor funds would certainly be 
fair to all investors, as each investor in a given survivor fund 
would be the same age (and, perhaps, the same gender), each 
investor would make the same initial contribution, and each 
survivor would get an equal share of from the accounts of the 
investors who died during the survivor-fund term.  
Unfortunately, the individual-cohort method has some 
practical problems. 
 
C. Projecting Investment Outcomes for the Survivors 
in a Survivor Fund Using the Individual-Cohort 
Method 
 
At the outset, an individual-cohort survivor fund would 
have trouble accurately projecting the investment outcomes 
that the survivors could anticipate receiving.  Under the 
individual-cohort method, the actual investment outcomes that 
the survivors would receive would depend on two principal 
factors: 1) the underlying performance of the investment 
assets; and 2) the actual mortality experience of the survivor-
fund investors.38  These are discussed in turn. 
 
1. The Underlying Performance of the Investment 
Assets 
 
First, for now, there is not much to say about the 
underlying performance of the investment assets.  While, in 
principle, a survivor fund could invest in anything from simple 
zero coupon bonds to complicated hedge funds,39 at this point in 
 
38.  Administrative costs could also play a role in investment outcomes, 
but we assume that these would be trivial.  See infra Part V.B.2. 
39.  See infra Part V.  See Hedge Fund, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 
2016).  The definition reads:  
 
Hedge funds are alternative investments using pooled funds 
that may use a number of different strategies in order to 
earn active return, or alpha, for their investors. Hedge 
funds may be aggressively managed or make use of 
derivatives and leverage in both domestic and international 
markets with the goal of generating high returns (either in 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
   
214 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:1 
the Article, it is simplest to assume that all of our hypothetical 
survivor funds would invest in 10-year zero coupon bonds with 
a 5% yield to maturity.40 
 
2. The Actual (and Projected) Mortality Experience 
of Survivor-fund Investors 
 
Second, however, there is a great deal to say about how the 
actual mortality experience of the survivor-fund investors will 
affect their actual investment outcomes.  In that regard, in 
making a projection of the anticipated investment outcomes for 
survivors of a specific survivor fund, an investment company 
would have to make some assumptions about the mortality 
experience of the survivor-fund investors (based on some kind 
of mortality table), but—and this is critical—the actual 
investment outcomes for the survivors will depend on the 
actual mortality experience of the survivor-fund investors and 
not on the investment company’s mortality assumptions. 
For example, in Part 2 above, we assumed that 1000 65-
year-old men each invested $1000 in a 10-year survivor fund 
that invested in 10-year zero coupon bonds with a 5% yield to 
maturity, and we further assumed that 800 of them would live 
to age 75—that is, 200 would die before then.  As a result, each 
of the 800 survivors got $2036 on their $1000 investments,41 
which is a 47% larger yield to maturity than if they had instead 
invested $1000 directly in the underlying 5% zero coupon 
bonds.42 
Pertinent here, if fewer than 200 investors had died during 
the 10-year term of that survivor fund, the survivor fund’s yield 
 
an absolute sense or over a specified market benchmark). 
Because hedge funds may have low correlations with a 
traditional portfolio of stocks and bonds, allocating an 
exposure to hedge funds can be a good diversifier. 
Id.  
40.  We note, in passing, that if the underlying investments in a survivor 
fund generated a higher-than-anticipated yield to maturity, the survivors 
would have better investment outcomes, and if the underlying investments 
generated a lower-than-anticipated yield to maturity, the survivors would 
have worse investment outcomes. 
41.  See supra note 26. 
42.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
11
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to maturity for the survivors would have been lower.43  On the 
other hand, if more than 200 investors had died, the survivor 
fund’s yield to maturity would have been higher.  To be sure, it 
is unlikely that exactly 200 investors would die, but it is 
incumbent upon the investment company to base its projected 
yield to maturity on the correct mortality table.  After all, U.S. 
securities laws require that investment companies provide 
accurate information (and projections) to investors,44 and using 
an incorrect mortality table for a given population of investors 
would result in inaccurate projections of the projected (and 
advertised) yields to maturity. 
We have much more to say about how to select the correct 
mortality table when one is needed.45  For now, it is enough to 
reiterate that the individual-cohort method’s reliance on 
mortality tables could lead to significant discrepancies between 
the projected and the actual investment outcomes for survivors. 
 
D. The Individual-Cohort Method Would Require 
Way Too Many Survivor Funds 
 
To be sure, there is a much larger practical problem with 
the individual-cohort method: an investment company using the 
individual-cohort method would have to offer way too many 
 
43.  The effect of mortality experience is more fully discussed in Part III, 
infra.  See Table 12 and accompanying text. 
44.  See, e.g., What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#.VQm1w010zPQ.  The 
Commission states:  
 
The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in 
the United States derive from a simple and straightforward 
concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about 
an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. 
To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to 
disclose meaningful financial and other information to the 
public. This provides a common pool of knowledge for all 
investors to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, 
or hold a particular security. Only through the steady flow 
of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can 
people make sound investment decisions. 
Id.  
45.  See infra Part III. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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different survivor funds.  After all, in addition to having to offer 
different survivor funds for each and every age cohort (and 
possibly for each and every age-gender cohort), an investment 
company would also want to offer each investor a choice of 
investments.  Some people would want to invest in government 
bonds, but others would want to invest in corporate bonds, 
large cap stocks,46 small cap stocks,47 global equities, real 
estate, commodities, hedge funds, or other alternative 
investments.48 
Moreover, not every investor would want to invest exactly 
the same amount.  Some would want to invest $1000, but 
others would want to invest $10,000 or even $100,000.  
Furthermore, as the easiest way to design a survivor fund is to 
have all the investors come in at roughly the same time, an 
investment company would need to create new and separate 
survivor funds every month or, at least, every quarter.  All in 
all, if an investment company tried to rely on the individual-
cohort method, it could easily end up having to offer hundreds 
of different survivor funds.  That would certainly drive up the 
company’s administrative costs, and it is likely that many of 
the survivor funds would be undersubscribed and have a very 
tough time performing as projected. 
We believe that investment companies would want to offer 
a much smaller number of survivor funds, and in Parts II and 
 
46.  See Large Cap - Big Cap, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/large-cap.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).  
“Large Cap - Big Cap” is a term used by the investment community to refer to 
companies with a “market capitalization value of more than $5 billion.”  Id.  
Large cap is an abbreviation of the term “large market capitalization.”  Id.  
“Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the number of a 
company’s shares outstanding by its stock price per share.”  Id.  
47.  See Small Cap, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/small-cap.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
“Small Cap” refers to stocks with a “relatively small market capitalization.”  
Id.  “The definition of small cap can vary among brokerages, but it is 
generally a company with a market capitalization of between $300 million 
and $2 billion.”  Id.  
48.  See Alternative Asset, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alternativeassets.asp (last visited Nov. 
6, 2016).  “Alternative Asset” refers to any “non-traditional asset with 
potential economic value that would not be found in a standard investment 
portfolio.”  Id.  “Due to the unconventional nature of alternative assets, 
valuation of some of these assets can be difficult.”  Id.  
13
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III below we offer some viable alternatives to the individual-
cohort method.  Before moving on to our explanations of those 
alternatives, however, we will use the much-simpler 
individual-cohort method to explain the troublesome variability 
in investment outcomes that would occur whenever a survivor 
fund has relatively few investors.49 
 
E. The Statistics of Getting Survivor Funds to 
Behave as Investors Expect 
 
Investment companies offering survivor funds would very 
much want to assure investors that their survivor funds would 
have predictable outcomes.  For example, an investment 
company might want to tell a 65-year-old man that, if he 
survives to age 75, his investment in a 10-year survivor fund 
would have a projected yield to maturity of, say, 7.6%, and that 
there would be a 95% chance that the actual yield to maturity 
would be in the range from 7.3% to 7.9% (i.e., 7.6% ± 0.3%).  
Unfortunately, because of the variability in mortality 
experience that would inevitably occur with any survivor fund 
that has relatively few investors, our hypothetical investment 
company would have a hard time relying on the individual-
cohort method to achieve investment outcomes in that small of 
a range.50 
 
49.  See Variability, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/variability.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 
2016).  “Variability” refers to “the extent to which data points in a statistical 
distribution or data set diverge from the average, or mean, value as well as 
the extent to which these data points differ from each other.  There are four 
commonly used measures of variability: range, mean, variance and standard 
deviation.”  Id.  
50.  Depending on the underlying investments, variability in investment 
performance would also be an issue for survivor funds.  To be sure, at this 
point in the Article, we are assuming that all survivor funds would invest in 
5% zero coupon bonds.  On the other hand, in Part V, infra, we explain how 
survivor funds could be designed to invest in all types of asset classes, many 
of which can be quite volatile.  For now, it is enough to say that if the rates of 
return on the underlying investments are volatile, then investment outcomes 
would vary both because of variability in mortality experience and also 
because of that investment volatility.  For example, if an investment 
company were to market a survivor fund that invested in small cap stocks 
instead of zero coupon bonds, the actual investment performance would be 
more variable, and it would be far less likely that 95% of the investment 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
   
218 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:1 
This is a practical problem that is best understood in terms 
of some simple mathematics (statistics, to be precise).  It comes 
down to this: with a small number of investors in a given 
survivor fund, the actual yields to maturity for the survivors 
could vary dramatically from the projected yield to maturity.  
That is where the law of large numbers comes into play.51  If 
the number of investors in a survivor fund is large, then the 
actual mortality experience of the investors in that fund would 
tend to be very close to what was expected, and, as a result, the 
actual yield to maturity would tend to be very close to what 
was projected.  On the other hand, if the number of investors is 
small, then the actual mortality experience of the investors 
would be likely to vary rather significantly from what was 
expected, and that would cause the actual yield to maturity to 
vary significantly from what was projected.  Simply put, the 
more investors there are in a survivor fund, the smaller the 
variance from the projected yield to maturity. 
At the outset, consider a hypothetical survivor fund with 
100 65-year-old men, and assume that the mortality rates of 
these 100 men follow the 2010 Social Security Administration 
area population mortality table shown in Appendix Table 1.52  
 
outcomes would fall within ± 0.3% of the expected rate of return on those 
small cap stocks. 
51.  See, e.g., Law Of Large Numbers, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/lawoflargenumbers.asp (last visited Jan. 
11, 2016).  A principle of probability and statistics which states that “as a 
sample size grows, its mean gets closer and closer to the average of the whole 
population.”  Id.  The law of large numbers in the financial context has a 
different connotation, which is that a “large entity which is growing rapidly 
cannot maintain that growth pace forever.  The biggest of the blue chips, with 
market values in the hundreds of billions, are frequently cited as examples of 
this phenomenon.”  Id.  
52.  Appendix Table 1 is drawn from the Social Security 
Administration’s 2010 period life table for the Social Security area population 
included in an e-mail from K. Mark Bye, Soc. Sec. Admin., to Jonathan Barry 
Forman (Dec. 3, 2014, 10:03 a.m. EST) (on file with authors).  Cf. Actuarial 
Life Table, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (2013), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2016).  
The 2013 table states:  
 
A period life table is based on the mortality experience of a 
population during a relatively short period of time. Here we 
present the 2013 period life table for the Social Security 
area population. For this table, the period life expectancy at 
15
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Loosely speaking, that table suggests that 21.59% of 65-year-
old men are expected to die before reaching age 75.53  
Obviously, in a group of 100 men, it is not possible for exactly 
21.59% of them to die, since the number of deaths must be a 
whole number; for example, twenty-one of the men could die, or 
twenty-two, but not 21.59.  Indeed, it is possible that the 
number of deaths could be any whole number in the range from 
zero to 100. Of course, the number of deaths is likely to be some 
whole number close to 21.59.  In that regard, Figure 1 shows 
that the number of deaths over the 10-year term of this 
survivor fund would take the approximate form of a normal 
distribution54 around the mean value of 21.59,55 and we will 
 
a given age is the average remaining number of years 
expected prior to death for a person at that exact age, born 
on January 1, using the mortality rates for 2013 over the 
course of his or her remaining life.  
Id. 
53.  Appendix Table 1 implies that of the 100,000 live male births in the 
table, 80,729 made it to age 65 and 63,300 of them made it to age 75.  That is, 
17,429 (21.58952%) of the 80,729 men alive at age 65 would die before 
reaching age 75 (17,429 = 80,729 – 63,300; 21.58952% = 17,429/80,729).  We 
say “implies” because the table only offers one-year death probabilities, and 
while we think that this footnote offers a reasonable way to approximate the 
10-year death probability for 65-year-old men, we assume that, if called upon 
to do so, the actuaries would use a much better approach and get a slightly 
different number.  An individual’s (one-year) death probability is his 
probability of dying within one year.  For example, Appendix Table 1 shows 
that a 65-year-old male has a 1.6% chance of dying before his next birthday 
(death probability, qi, of 0.015927). 
54.  Normal Distribution, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/normaldistribution.asp (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2016).  “Normal Distribution” is “the probability distribution that 
plots all of its values in a symmetrical fashion, and most of the results are 
situated around the probability’s mean.”  Id.  “Values are equally likely to 
plot either above or below the mean. Grouping takes place at values that are 
close to the mean and then tails off symmetrically away from the mean.”  Id.  
A “Normal Distribution” is also known as the Gaussian distribution or “bell 
curve.”  Id.  See also Deborah J. Rumsey, How to Find the Normal 
Approximation to the Binomial with a Large Sample N, DUMMIES, 
http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-to-find-the-normal-
approximation-to-the-binomi.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
55.  See, e.g., Arithmetic Mean, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/arithmeticmean.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 
2016).  “The arithmetic mean is a mathematical representation of the typical 
value of a series of numbers, computed as the sum of all the numbers in the 
series divided by the count of all numbers in the series. The arithmetic mean 
is sometimes referred to as the average or simply as the mean.”  Id.  
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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work with such fractional numbers throughout this Article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With 100 65-year-old men, the standard deviation56—
which is a measure of the dispersion of the number of deaths 
about the mean—is 4.11.57  In a normal distribution, 95.45% of 
 
56.  The standard deviation is a mathematical measure of variance.  
Literally, the standard deviation is the square root of the variance, and the 
variance is the average of the squared differences between population values 
and their mean. See, e.g., Standard Deviation and Variance, MATH IS FUN, 
http://www.mathsisfun.com/data/standard-deviation.html (last visited Nov. 6, 
2016); see also Standard Deviation, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/standarddeviation.asp (last visited Nov. 
6, 2016).  “Standard deviation is a measure of the dispersion of a set of data 
from its mean.”  Id.  The more spread apart the data, the higher the 
deviation.  Id.  “Standard deviation is calculated as the square root of 
variance. . . .”  Id.  
57.  Calculated using the formula for the standard deviation of a 
binomial distribution: 4.11445 = σ = √(np(1 – p) = (np(1 – p))0.5 = (100 × 0.2159 
× (1 – 0.2159))0.5,where n is the sample size and p is the individual 
probability. 
0 10 20 30 40
Number of Deaths
Figure 1.  Probability Density of Number of 
Deaths Over 10 Years for a Group of 100 65-
year-old Men 
Shaded Area is
95% Probability 
Range
(from 13.37 to 
29.81)
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the outcomes fall within two standard deviations of the mean; 
that is, there is a 95.45% probability that the actual number of 
deaths in a 100-man sample would be in the range from 13.37 
to 29.81.58  For ease of wording, however, we will usually 
abbreviate “95.45%” as “95%” and the “95.45% range” as the 
“95% range.”  In summary, for our hypothetical 100-65-year-
old-man survivor fund, we project that the mean number of 
deaths will be 21.59 and that there is a 95% probability that 
the number of deaths occurring will be in the range from 13.37 
to 29.81. 
Continuing with our hypothetical example, we further 
assume that each of the 100 65-year-old men invested $1000 in 
a survivor fund that would hold 10-year zero coupon bonds 
with a 5% yield to maturity, so that the value of each man’s 
original investment would grow to $1628.89 at the end of the 
10-year survivor-fund term.  As we projected that 21.59 of 
those men would die during the 10-year term of the zero 
coupon bonds, the 78.41 men who survived the ten years would 
have a projected mortality-gain distribution of $448.51,59 and, 
therefore, we project that each of the survivors would collect 
$2077.40 at that time ($2077.40 = $1628.89 + $448.51).  Figure 
2 shows the near-normal distribution of the projected 
mortality-gain distributions for the survivors of this survivor 
fund.60 
 
58.  Two standard deviations below the mean is 13.37 = 21.59 – (2 × 
4.11), and two standard deviations above the mean is 29.81 = 21.59 + (2 × 
4.11).  
59.  $448.51 = (21.59 × $1628.89)/78.41.  Recall that in supra note 53, we 
showed that 21.59% of 65-year-old men are expected to die before reaching 
age 75, which means that 78.41% are expected to survive.  21.59 = 100 × 
21.59%; 78.41 = 100 × 78.41%; 78.41% = 100% – 21.59%. 
60.  The formula for mortality-gain distributions is $1628.89 × d/(100 – 
d), where d is the number of deaths.  As we discussed in note 52 and 
accompanying text, the number of deaths (d) is normally distributed.  See 
supra Figure 1. On the other hand, the function (d/(100 – d)) is not normally 
distributed, but it does appear to be near normal. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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Figure 2 also shows the 95% range of mortality-gain 
distributions, based on the 95% range of deaths from Figure 1 
(from 13.37 to 29.81 deaths).  At one end of the 95% range, if 
there were 13.37 deaths, then each of the 86.63 survivors 
would receive a mortality-gain distribution of $251.39.61  At the 
other end of the 95% range, if there were 29.81 deaths, then 
each of the 70.19 survivors would receive a mortality-gain 
distribution of $691.80.62  In summary, the investment 
company could fairly advertise that there would be a 95% 
 
61.  $251.39 = (13.37 × $1628.89)/86.63; 86.63 = 100 – 13.37. 
62.  $691.80 = (29.81 × 1628.89)/70.19; 70.19 = 100 – 29.81. 
$0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1,000
Mortality-gain Distribution
Figure 2.  Probability Density of Mortality-
gain Distribution for the Survivors of an 
Individual Cohort of 100 65-year-old Men
Shaded Area is
95%  Probability 
Range
(from $251.39 to 
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probability that survivors would receive a mortality-gain 
distribution of from $251 to $692. 
Finally, the investment company could also express these 
survivor-fund investment outcomes in terms of yields to 
maturity on the survivor’s original $1000 investments.  That is, 
the investment company could fairly advertise that investors 
could anticipate a projected yield to maturity of around 7.59%63 
and that there would be a 95% probability that those survivors 
would receive a yield to maturity of from 6.5% to 8.8%.64  See 
Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63.  7.58507% = (($1628.89 + $448.51)/$1000.00)0.1 – 1.  Recall that the 
projected yield to maturity happens when the actual mortality-gain 
distribution equals the projected mortality-gain distribution.  See supra note 
59 and accompanying text (for $1628.89 and $448.51). 
64.  6.51782% = (($1628.89 + $251.39) /1000.00)0. – 1; 8.78317% = 
(($1628.89 + $691.80) /1000.00)0.1 – 1. 
5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0%
Yield to Maturity
Fig 3.  Probability Density of Yield to 
Maturity for Survivors of an Individual 
Cohort of 100 65-year-old Men
Shaded Area is
95%  
Probability 
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Unfortunately, 6.5% to 8.8% is a rather large 95%-yield-to-
maturity range for an investment company that is trying to 
promote an investment product.  This 95%-yield-to-maturity 
range is large because, with only 100 investors, the standard 
deviation of the number of deaths (4.11) is sizable relative to 
the mean number of deaths (21.59).  If the survivor fund could 
attract more than 100 investors, however, the 95%-yield-to-
maturity range would shrink.  Basically, the larger the sample 
size, the smaller the standard deviation of the sample.65  For 
example, with 1000 65-year-old men, the 95%-yield-to-maturity 
range would shrink to just 7.2% to 7.9%.66  More generally, 
Figure 4 shows how the 95%-yield-to-maturity range would 
shrink as the number of 65-year-old male investors in a 
survivor fund using the individual-cohort method increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65.  The formula is σS = σ/√n, where σS is the standard deviation of the 
sample, σ is the standard deviation of the population, and n is the sample 
size.  See, e.g., Douglas G. Altman & J Martin Bland, Standard Deviations 
and Standard Errors, 331 BRITISH MED. J. 7521 (2005), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1255808/; Deborah J. Rumsey, 
How Sample Size Affects Standard Error, DUMMIES, 
http://www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-sample-size-affects-standard-
error.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2016). 
66.  For 1000 65-year-old male investors, the mean number of deaths 
would be 215.9, and the standard deviation of the number of deaths would be 
13.01 = (1000 × 0.2159 × (1 – 0.2159))0.5.  Two standard deviations below the 
mean would be 189.88 = 215.9 – (2 ×13.01), for a lower mortality-gain 
distribution of $381.79 = 189.88/(1000 – 189.88) × $1628.89, and a lower yield 
to maturity of 7.23444% = (($1628.89 + $381.79)/$1000.00)0.1 – 1.  Two 
standard deviations above the mean would be 241.92 = 215.9 + (2 × 13.01), 
for an upper mortality-gain distribution of $519.81 = 241.92/(1000 – 241.92) × 
$1628.89, and an upper yield to maturity of 7.94874% = (($1628.89 + 
$519.81)/$1000.00)0.1 – 1. 
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It seems reasonable to conclude from Figure 4 that a 
survivor fund using the individual-cohort method could operate 
with as few as 500 identical investors; that is to say that the 
95%-yield-to-maturity range for such a fund would be 
acceptably narrow.  Still, we doubt that investment companies 
would want to offer a different survivor fund for each age-
gender cohort, nor would they want to require that each 
investor put in exactly the same amount in exactly the same 
type of investment.  For example, we would be surprised if an 
investment company could even find 500 73-year-old women 
who were willing to each invest exactly $1000 in the 10-year 
survivor fund that started on May 1, 2017 and that invested in 
small cap stocks.  We doubt that any investment company 
would be willing to take on that kind of marketing risk. 
Instead, we believe that investment companies offering 
survivor funds would want to offer just a few different survivor 
funds for investors each month (or quarter).  To reduce the 
number of survivor funds that an investment company would 
6.0%
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Figure 4. Yield-to-maturity Range for Survivors 
of an Individual Cohort of 65-year-old Men
Likely Range of Yield to Maturity
(95% Probability)
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need to offer, we need to find a fair way to combine different 
cohorts of investors together into the same survivor fund, and 
we also need to find a fair way to combine investors who make 
different levels of investment. 
Ideally, then, separate survivor funds should not be 
created based on individual investor characteristics like age, 
gender, or investment amount. Instead, separate survivor 
funds should combine various cohorts of investors, but be 
designed only to offer different kinds of underlying 
investments.  For example, we can imagine that each month an 
investment company would offer a handful of 10-year survivor 
funds where each fund invested in different assets, such as 
government bonds, corporate bonds, large cap stocks, small cap 
stocks, and so on.  The individual-cohort method could not be 
used to fairly reallocate mortality gains in such multi-cohort 
survivor funds, but both the date-aligned method that we 
discuss in Part II below and the age-aligned method that we 
discuss in Part IV below could be used to achieve such fair 
reallocations. 
 
II. DESIGNING SURVIVOR FUNDS THAT ARE FAIR TO 
ALL TYPES OF INVESTORS: THE DATE-ALIGNED 
METHOD 
 
In a simple survivor fund, when an investor dies, the 
balance in her account (i.e., her contribution plus investment 
earnings) would be divided equally among the surviving 
investors.  Unfortunately, if the survivor fund included a 
variety of investors, that approach would result in an unfair 
situation, for example, because it would favor younger 
investors who are likely to live longer and receive more 
mortality-gain distributions.  On the contrary, if a survivor 
fund has investors with different ages, genders, and 
investment levels, “the surviving investors should not get equal 
portions of a dying member’s balance.  Instead, the [mortality-
gain] distributions should be made in unequal portions, 
carefully chosen to provide fair bets for all investors.  In short, 
a [survivor] fund should be governed by a fair transfer-plan 
that accounts for each [investor’s mortality risk] (i.e., death 
23
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probability)67 and investment level.”68 In this Part, we describe 
how such survivor funds could be designed. 
 
 The Basic Design and Operation of a Survivor Fund: 
The Date-Aligned Method 
 
This subpart explains in greater detail the basic design 
and operation of survivor funds. More specifically, this subpart 
develops the so-called “date-aligned method” that can be used 
to design survivor funds that are fair to a broad range of 
investors, including those with different ages, genders, and 
investment levels.69 
At the outset, Table 1 shows the membership of a simple 
survivor fund.  To keep this initial example as simple as 
possible (and also to keep it consistent with the simple, single-
cohort survivor fund that we described in Part 2 above), we 
assume: 1) that there are just ten investors in this survivor 
fund; 2) that each member (i) is a 65-year-old male who has 
contributed $1000 (ci) to an account that invests in 10-year zero 
coupon bonds; and 3) that each zero coupon bond has a 5% 
yield to maturity leading to a final account value (si) for each 
member of $1628.89.70  That $1628.89 is the amount that each 
member would receive after ten years if none of the ten 
investors died.  We do not have to worry about the value of the 
account at any intermediate time; it suffices (and it is more 
convenient) to just work with the account value at maturity 
(i.e., t = 10). 
 
 
67.  The term “fair transfer-plan” is derived from Sabin, supra note 12, 
at 5.  See also Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 776.  
Recall that an individual’s death probability is his probability of dying within 
one year.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
68.  Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 776 (emphasis 
added).   
69.  The approach parallels what we did in Forman & Sabin, Tontine 
Pensions, supra note 6, at 776-84. 
70.  $1628.89 = $1000.00 × (1.00 + 0.05). 
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Table 1. A Simple Survivor Fund with Ten 65-year-old Male 
Members 
Member 
(i) 
Age 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Contribution 
(ci) 
Account Value 
at Maturity 
(si) 
1 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
2 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
3 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
4 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
5 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
6 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
7 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
8 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
9 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
10 65 male $1000 $1628.89 
 
The survivor fund starts with the members all making 
their contributions at time 0, and nothing happens until the 
end of the 10-year investment term (i.e., until the maturity 
date of the underlying zero coupon bonds).  At that time (i.e., 
time 10), the survivor fund will create a fair transfer-plan to 
reallocate the balances in the accounts of any members who 
died before time 10 among the survivors in a way that provides 
fair bets for all of the members. 
For example, suppose that two of the ten members (20%) 
died during the 10-year-survivor-fund term.71  At time 10, we 
would reallocate the $1628.89 in the accounts of those two 
decedents, one at a time, and in the order that their deaths 
occurred.  We call this the “date-aligned method,” and here is 
how it would work: 
Suppose that member 3 was the first member to die and 
that his death occurred 3.33 years after the start of the 
survivor fund (when all ten members of the survivor fund were 
68.33 years-old, 68.33 = 65 + 3.33).  Since this would be the 
first death to occur, all ten members would compete equally in 
the first fair transfer-plan, and we would use that fair transfer-
 
71.  Again, 20% is a very reasonable mortality rate for a population of 
65-year-old men.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text, and recall that 
we showed in supra note 53 that approximately 21.59% of 65-year-old men in 
the 2010 Social Security area population mortality table could be expected to 
die before reaching the age of 75. 
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plan to distribute dying member 3’s $1628.89 to the nine 
survivors.  Table 2 shows the results after that first death. 
 
Table 2. Accounting for the First Death, Date-aligned Method 
Member 
(i) 
Account Value 
at Maturity 
(si) 
Fair-transfer-plan 
Weight 
(wi) 
Account Balance 
After the 
First Distribution 
(b1i) 
1 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
2 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
3 $1628.89 0.1 $ 0.00 
4 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
5 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
6 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
7 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
8 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
9 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
10 $1628.89 0.1 $1809.88 
 
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the member (i) and column 2 
shows the account value in that member’s account at maturity 
(si).72  Column 3 of Table 2 shows a parameter that we call the 
fair-transfer-plan weight (wi).  When a member of a survivor 
fund dies, the maturity value of his account is forfeited and 
divided among the survivors, with each survivor receiving some 
fraction of the decedent’s account which is based on that 
survivor’s fair-transfer-plan weight (wi). 
More specifically, if member j dies, each surviving member 
i would receive some fraction of j’s $1628.89 account value at 
maturity.  Mathematically, the fraction that each member i 
would receive of member j’s account (sj) is equal to wi/(1 – wj), 
for i ≠ j.  The fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) are positive values 
that sum to one, so the denominator (1 – wj) is the sum of all 
fair transfer-plan weights (wi) except that of member j. 
Meanwhile, member j would forfeit all $1628.89 in his account. 
Pertinent here, since all ten members in our simple 
survivor fund were the same age when member 3 died (68.33 
years-old), the same gender (male), and made the same 
contribution ($1000), all ten members would have the same 
fair-transfer-plan weight, wi = 0.1 = 1/10 (see column 3 of Table 
 
72.  These values come from column 5 of Table 1. 
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2).  Accordingly, at time 10, when it is time to divide the 
$1628.89 in member 3’s account among the nine members who 
survived him, each of those nine survivors would receive 
$180.99 = s3 × wi/(1 – w3) = $1628.89 × 0.1/(1 – 0.1),73 and, of 
course, member 3 would forfeit the $1628.89 in his account.  In 
short, each of the nine survivors would get a mortality gain of 
$180.99 and would enter the next distribution with an account 
balance after the first distribution (b1i) of $1809.88 = $1628.89 
+ $180.99 (see column 4 of Table 2).74  We refer to the $180.99 
distributions to members 1, 2, and 4-10 as mortality-gain 
distributions; meanwhile, member 3 had a $1628.89 mortality 
loss. 
Now suppose that member 7 was the second member to die 
and that his death occurred 6.67 years after the start of the 
survivor fund (when the nine surviving members of the 
survivor fund were 71.67 years-old (71.67 = 65 + 6.67).  As 
before, we would create a fair transfer-plan, but this time just 
for the nine members who survived to age 71.67.  Those nine 
survivors would compete equally in the second fair transfer-
plan, and we would use that fair transfer-plan to reallocate 
dying member 7’s $1809.88 to the eight members who survived 
him.  Table 3 shows the results after that second mortality-
gain distribution. 
 
73.  Put differently (and, perhaps, more simply), $180.99 is $1628.89 
divided equally among the nine identical survivors ($180.99 = $1628.89/9). 
74.  $1809.88 = si + (s3 × wi/(1 – w3)) = $1628.89 + $180.99. 
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Table 3. Accounting for the Second Death, Date-aligned 
Method 
Member 
(i) 
Account Balance 
After the 
First Distribution 
(b1i) 
Fair-transfer-plan 
Weight 
(wi) 
Account Balance 
After the 
Second Distribution 
(b2i) 
1 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
2 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
3 $  0.00 dead@68.33 $  0.00 
4 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
5 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
6 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
7 $1809.88 0.111111 $  0.00 
8 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
9 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
10 $1809.88 0.111111 $2036.11 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the member (i), and column 2 of 
Table 3 shows the value of each member’s account balance 
after the first distribution (b1i).75  Column 3 of Table 3 shows 
the applicable fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) for each of the 
nine members who survived until time 6.67.  As all nine 
surviving members were the same age when the second 
member died (71.67 years-old), the same gender (male), and 
have the same balances in their account after the first 
mortality-gain distribution (b1i  = $1809.88); all nine have the 
same fair transfer-plan weight, wi = 0.111111 = 1/9.  
Accordingly, at time 10, when it is time to divide the $1809.88 
in member 7’s account among the remaining eight members 
who survive him, each of those eight survivors will receive a 
mortality-gain distribution of $226.23 = b17 × wi/(1 – w7) = 
$1809.88 × 0.111111/(1 – 0.111111),76 and each ends up with an 
account balance after the second distribution (b2i) of $2036.11 
= $1809.88 + $226.23 (see column 4 of Table 3).77  Of course, 
member 7 would forfeit his $1809.88 and end up with a zero 
account balance (see column 4 of Table 3). 
 
75.  These values come from column 4 of Table 2. 
76.  Put differently (and, perhaps, more simply), $226.243 is $1809.88 
divided equally among the eight remaining survivors ($226.235 = 
$1809.88/8). 
77.  $2036.11 = b1i + (b17 × wi/(1 – w7)) = $1809.88 + $226.23. 
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As we assumed that there were no further deaths during 
the 10-year survivor-fund term, that $2036.11 account balance 
after the second distribution (b2i) would also be the ending 
account balance (bei) for the eight surviving members (see 
column 5 of Table 4), and each of these eight survivors would 
have that $2036.11 distributed to them at that time (again, at t 
= 10).  Column 6 of Table 4 also shows that the yield to 
maturity (yi) for these eight survivors would be 7.37%, as 
opposed to the 5% yield to maturity on the underlying zero 
coupon bonds.78 
 
Table 4. The End of a 10-man Survivor Fund with Eight 
Survivors, Date-aligned Method 
Member 
(i) 
Ending 
Age 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Initial 
Contribution 
(ci) 
Ending 
Account 
Balance 
(bei) 
Yield to 
Maturity 
(yi) 
1 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
2 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
3 dead@68.33 Male $1000 $  0.00 n/a 
4 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
5 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
6 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
7 dead@71.67 Male $1000 $  0.00 n/a 
8 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
9 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
10 75 Male $1000 $2036.11 7.37% 
 
Not surprisingly, with this group of investors who are 
identical in age, gender, and investment level, the date-aligned 
method reaches the exact same results as the individual-cohort 
method would.  More specifically, the date-aligned method here 
got the same $2036 ending account balance and the same 
7.37% yield to maturity that we found in Part 2 above (where 
we divided the $1,628,894.63 proceeds from $1,000,000 worth 
of 10-year, zero coupon bonds among the 800 survivors of that 
1000-65-year-old-man, individual-cohort survivor fund).79 
Indeed, both the individual-cohort method and the date-
aligned method would result in fair reallocations any time all of 
 
78.  7.36930% = ($2036.11/$1000.00 )0.1 – 1. 
79.  There is a one-cent difference in the ending account balances here 
($2036.11) and there ($2036.12) due to rounding of intermediate calculations. 
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the survivor-fund members are identical (i.e., have the same 
age and gender and have made exactly the same level of 
contributions).  As we will see in the next few subparts of this 
Article, however, only something like the date-aligned method 
that we developed in this subpart could be used to achieve fair 
reallocations when members of a survivor fund have different 
ages, genders, or investment levels. 
 
 Survivor Funds Using the Date-Aligned Method Would 
Be Fair to Investors of Different Ages 
 
This subpart shows that survivor funds using the date-
aligned method would be fair to investors of different ages.  For 
example, Table 5 shows another 10-man survivor fund.  We 
again assume that each member (i) has invested $1000 (ci) in 
the survivor fund and that the survivor fund invests in zero 
coupon bonds that mature in ten years with a 5% yield to 
maturity for a final value at maturity for each member of 
$1628.89 (si), but, this time, our ten male investors are different 
ages.  This survivor fund again starts at time 0, and nothing 
happens until the end of the 10-year, survivor-fund term.  At 
that time (time 10), the survivor fund would again use a fair 
transfer-plan to reallocate the balances in the accounts of the 
members who died before time 10 among the survivors. 
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Table 5. A Survivor Fund with 10 Male Members of Different 
Ages, Date-aligned Method 
Member 
(i) 
Age 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Account 
Value 
at 
Maturity 
(si) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(years) 
(ei) 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
1 65 male $1628.89 17.57 0.015927 
2 66 male $1628.89 16.84 0.017370 
3 67 male $1628.89 16.13 0.018895 
4 68 male $1628.89 15.43 0.020484 
5 69 male $1628.89 14.75 0.022191 
6 70 male $1628.89 14.07 0.024139 
7 71 male $1628.89 13.40 0.026364 
8 72 male $1628.89 12.75 0.028808 
9 73 male $1628.89 12.12 0.031480 
10 74 male $1628.89 11.49 0.034442 
 
Because our members are different ages, however, we 
would use death probabilities from a mortality table to create 
the fair transfer-plan.80  As a starting point, column 2 of Table 
5 shows the age (xi) of each man, column 5 shows his initial life 
expectancy at that age (ei),81 and column 6 shows his death 
probability (qi) at that age.  These values are drawn from the 
2010 Social Security Administration area population mortality 
table in Appendix Table 1.  For example, member 3 in Table 5 
is a 67-year-old man (columns 2 & 3) who has a life expectancy 
(ei) of 16.13 years (column 5) and a 1.9% chance of dying before 
reaching age 68 (column 6; i.e., a death probability, qi, of 
0.018895). 
To make comparisons easy, we again assume that two 
members of this survivor fund would die over the 10-year 
survivor-fund term:82 member 3 would die at time 3.33, and 
member 7 would die at time 6.67.  We again use the date-
 
80.  Recall that an individual’s death probability is his probability of 
dying within the next year.  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
81.  Recall that life expectancy at a given age is the average remaining 
number of years expected prior to death for a person at that exact age.  See 
supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
82.  We note, in passing, that this example is not quite as reasonable as 
the one in Part I.A (Table 1): given the relatively older population in the 
survivor fund in Table 5, it is likely that more than two (out of 10) members 
would die over the 10-year, survivor-fund term. 
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aligned method that we developed in Part I.A.  As all ten 
members would be alive when the first death occurs at time 
3.33, all ten would compete in the first fair transfer-plan, and 
we would again create a fair transfer-plan to reallocate dying 
member 3’s $1628.89 to the nine survivors.  Table 6 shows the 
results after that first mortality-gain distribution. 
 
Table 6. Accounting for the First Death in a Survivor Fund 
with Members of Different Ages, Date-aligned Method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Column 1 of Table 6 shows the member (i), and column 2 
shows the ages of the members at the time of the first death (t 
= 3.33), ranging from 68.33-years-old for member 1 (68.33 = 65 
+ 3.33) to 77.33-years-old for member 10 (77.33 = 74 + 3.33).  
Column 4 of Table 6 shows the $1628.89 account value at 
maturity (si) for each of the founding investors in this survivor 
fund. 
Pertinent here, as the ten members are different ages, they 
should have different fair-transfer-plan weights.  In general, a 
fair transfer-plan should reallocate more of each decedent’s 
mortality losses to older survivors than to younger survivors 
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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precisely because younger members are more likely to survive 
to collect more mortality-gain distributions than older 
members; that is, older survivors should receive more than 
younger survivors to ensure that all members get a fair bet.  
Here is how it works: 
At the outset, Column 5 of Table 6 also shows a parameter 
known as the force-of-mortality probability (fi).83  These force-
of-mortality probabilities indicate the relative probability of 
death for each member of the survivor fund at time t.  In that 
regard, if, at the instant that a member died, one member has 
a force-of-mortality probability with a value f, and another has 
a value 2f, then the second member is twice as likely as the 
first to be the one who died.  For example, member 10, who 
would be 77.33 years-old at time 3.33, had a relatively large 
force-of-mortality probability (0.047) at that time, while 
member 1, who was just 68.33 years-old then, had a relatively 
small force-of-mortality probability (0.021).  In short, member 
10 would clearly be the more likely of the two to have died at 
time 3.33.  Indeed, of the ten members in Table 5, member 10 
would be the most likely to have died first.  These force-of-
mortality probabilities (fi) are relatively easy to compute from 
the death probabilities (qi) in a mortality table (i.e., column 6 of 
Table 5).84 
We then use these force-of-mortality probabilities (fi) to 
determine the fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) in column 6 of 
Table 6.85  Then, as in Part I.A above, we use those fair-
transfer-plan weights (wi) to divide the account value at 
maturity of the member who died at time 3.33.  Recall that we 
again assumed that it would be member 3 who died at time 
3.33.  As column 7 of Table 6 shows, member 3 would lose the 
$1628.89 in his account, and that $1628.89 would be divided 
among the nine survivors and added to their accounts.  For 
example, member 1 would receive mortality-gain distribution of  
$108.43 = s3 × w1/(1 – w3) = $1628.89 × 0.061656/(1 – 0.073742); 
 
83.  This explanation follows Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra 
note 6, at 777-78. 
84.  For a more detailed explanation of the computation of force-of-
mortality probabilities (fi), see, id. at 778 n.111. 
85.  For a more detailed explanation of the computation of fair-transfer-
plan weights (wi), see id. at 778 n.112. 
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and that $108.43 would be added to his starting account value 
at maturity (s1) of $1628.89 to get an account balance after the 
first distribution (b11) of $1737.32 (see column 7 of Table 6).86  
On the other hand, member 10 would get a mortality-gain 
distribution of $273.76 and end up with an account balance 
after the first distribution (b110) of $1902.65.87 
Next, to account for the death of member 7 at time 6.67, we 
would create a second fair transfer-plan to reallocate dying 
member 7’s $1822.50 (b17, from column 7 of Table 6) among 
the eight members who survived him.  Table 7 shows the 
results after that second mortality-gain distribution. 
 
Table 7. Accounting for the Second Death in a Survivor Fund 
with Members of Different Ages, Date-aligned Method 
 
Member 
(i) 
Age at 
the 
Second 
Death 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Account 
Balance 
After the 
First 
Distribution 
(b1i) 
 Fair-
transfer- 
plan 
Weight 
(wi) 
Account 
Balance 
After the 
Second 
Distribution 
(b2i) 
1 71.67 male $1737.32  0.060657 $1862.87 
2 72.67 male $1747.16  0.067208 $1886.27 
3 dead@70.33 male $  0.00  dead@70.33 $  0.00 
4 74.67 male $1771.86  0.083144 $1943.95 
5 75.67 male $1786.76  0.093354 $1979.98 
6 76.67 male $1803.46  0.105478 $2021.78 
7 dead@77.67 male $1822.50  0.119464 $  0.00 
8 78.67 male $1845.20  0.135718 $2126.11 
9 79.67 male $1872.02  0.155220 $2193.29 
10 80.67 male $1902.65  0.179756 $2274.71 
 
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the member (i), and column 2 
shows the age of the member at the time of the second death (t 
= 6.67).  Column 4 of Table 7 shows the account balance for 
each member after the first distribution (b1i),88 and column 5 of 
Table 7 shows each member’s fair-transfer-plan weight (wi) at 
 
86.  $1737.32 = s1 + (s3 × w1/(1 – w3)) = $1628.89 + $108.43. 
87.  $1902.65 = s10 + (s3 × w10/(1 – w3)) = $1628.89 + ($1628.89 × 
0.155671/(1 – 0.073742)) = $1628.89 + $273.76. 
88.  These values come from column 7 of Table 6. 
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that time.89  As columns 4 and 6 of Table 7 show, member 7 
would lose the $1822.50 in his account, and it would be divided 
among the eight survivors and added to their accounts.  For 
example, member 1 would have $125.55 added to his $1737.32 
account balance after the first distribution (b11) to get an 
account balance after the second distribution (b21) of 
$1862.87.90 
As we assumed there would be no further deaths during 
the 10-year survivor-fund term, the account balances after the 
second distribution (b2i) are also the ending account balances 
(bei) for the eight final members (see column 5 of Table 8), and 
each of the eight survivors would have his balance distributed 
to him at that time.  Column 6 of Table 8 also shows that the 
yields to maturity (yi) for all eight survivors would be 
significantly higher than the 5% yield to maturity on the 
underlying zero coupon bonds. 
 
Table 8. The End of a Ten-man Survivor Fund with Eight 
Survivors of Different Ages, Date-aligned Method 
Member 
(i) 
Ending 
Age 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Initial 
Contribution 
(ci) 
Ending 
Account 
Balance 
(bei) 
Yield to 
Maturity 
(yi) 
1 75 male $1000 $1862.87 6.42% 
2 76 male $1000 $1886.27 6.55% 
3 dead@70.33 male $1000 $  0.00 n/a 
4 78 male $1000 $1943.95 6.87% 
5 79 male $1000 $1979.98 7.07% 
6 80 male $1000 $2021.78 7.29% 
7 dead@71.67 male $1000 $  0.00 n/a 
8 82 male $1000 $2126.11 7.83% 
9 83 male $1000 $2193.29 8.17% 
10 84 male $1000 $2274.71 8.57% 
 
In short, the date-aligned method can accommodate 
investors of different ages.  To be sure, columns 5 and 6 of 
Table 8 make it appear that older survivors would do better 
 
89.  Determining the values of these fair transfer plan weights (wi) is 
more complicated, as the surviving members now differ in both age and 
account balance. 
90.  $1862.87 = b1i + (b17 × w1/(1 – w7)) = $1737.32 + ($1822.50 × 
0.060657/(1 – 0.119464)) = $1737.32 + $125.55. 
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than younger survivors, but remember that older members 
would actually be less likely to survive all ten years than 
younger survivors.  Accordingly, a fair transfer-plan must give 
more of each decedent’s mortality losses to older survivors than 
to younger survivors—precisely because the younger members 
would be more likely to survive all ten years, and all of the 
members should get a fair bet.  The key to a date-aligned, fair 
transfer-plan is to use death probabilities to generate fair-
transfer-plan weights (wi) that offer fair bets to members of all 
ages.  Moreover, while the survivor fund that we used as our 
example only involved investors aged 65 to 74, theoretically, a 
survivor fund could accommodate members of all ages.91 
 
 Survivor Funds Using the Date-Aligned Method Could 
Be Fair to Both Men and Women 
 
Similarly, survivor funds could be designed to take gender 
into account.92  In that regard, “[w]omen tend to live longer 
than men and have lower death probabilities than same-aged 
men.”93  For example, Appendix Table 1 shows that while a 65-
year-old man in the 2010 Social Security area population had a 
17.57-year life expectancy and a 1.6% death probability, a 65-
 
91.  Pertinent here, we doubt that short-term survivor funds would be 
very attractive to young investors.  Younger survivors often have such low 
death probabilities that their yields to maturity from survivor funds would be 
only slightly higher than the yields to maturity on the underlying 
investments.  For example, we doubt that many parents would use survivor 
funds to save for their children’s college education.  Imagine that the parents 
of 1000 8-year-old male children each contributed $1000 to a survivor fund 
that held $1,000,000 worth of 10-years zero coupon bonds earning a 5% yield 
to maturity.  Appendix Table 1 suggests that of the 100,000 live male births 
in the table, 99,176 could be expected to make it to age 8, and 98,906 of them 
could be expected to make it to age 18.  In effect, the table suggests that just 
270 (0.27%) of those 8-year-old boys would die before reaching age 18 (270 = 
99,176-98,906; 0.27222% = 270/99,176).  It follows that out of the 1000 8-year-
old boys whose parents invested in that survivor fund, approximately 997 of 
them would still be alive at age 18 (997.28 = 1000 × 98,906/99,176).  On 
average, the winners who survived those ten years could anticipate receiving 
negligible mortality-gain distributions of just $5 ($1633.80 = 
$1,628,894.63/997; $4.91 = $1633.80 – $1628.89). 
92.  See generally Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 
780-81. 
93.  Id. 
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year-old woman had a 20.20-year life expectancy and just a 
1.0% death probability.  While a survivor fund that included 
both men and women could use a unisex mortality table to 
determine the fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) that would result 
in their final account balances, a survivor fund could instead 
use a gender-based mortality table to take gender into account.  
To be sure, we are not advocating that survivor funds should 
take gender into account, but only noting that they could.94 
 
 Survivor Funds Using the Date-Aligned Method Would 
Fairly Accommodate Investors with Differing Levels of 
Investment 
 
Survivor funds could also be designed to allow members to 
make differing levels of contributions.95  For example, Table 9 
shows another 10-man survivor fund, but this time we assume 
that these otherwise-identical men would have different 
contribution levels (ci) ranging from $1000 to $10,000 (column 
4).  As before, we assumed that two members of the survivor 
fund would die over the 10-year survivor-fund term: member 3 
would die at time 3.33, and member 7 would die at time 6.67.  
We again used the date-aligned method that we developed in 
Part I.A , and Table 9 shows the final results.  Again, the yields 
to maturity (yi) for the eight survivors would be significantly 
higher than the 5% yield to maturity on the underlying zero 
coupon bonds; meanwhile, members 3 and 7 would forfeit their 
investments (see columns 5 & 6 of Table 9).  In short, the date-
aligned method would accommodate investors with different 
investment levels. 
 
 
94.  Cf., Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in Insurance: The Next 
Chapter, 49 GA. L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that gender nondiscrimination laws 
should be expanded to prevent insurance companies from selling gender-
based annuities).  See also Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, 
at 823-26 (discussing a number of similar gender issues). 
95.  See generally Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 
782-83. 
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Table 9. A Survivor Fund with Members Making Different 
Contributions, Date-aligned Method 
Member 
(i) 
Ending Age 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Initial 
Contribution 
(ci) 
Ending 
Account 
Balance 
(bei) 
Yield to 
Maturity 
(yi) 
1 75 male   $1000 $  1942.07 6.86% 
2 75 male   $2000 $  3895.58 6.89% 
3 dead@68.33 male   $3000 $ 0.00 n/a 
4 75 male   $4000 $  7842.63 6.96% 
5 75 male   $5000 $  9839.82 7.00% 
6 75 male   $6000 $11,856.02 7.05% 
7 dead@71.67 male   $7000 $ 0.00 n/a 
8 75 male   $8000 $15,959.60 7.15% 
9 75 male   $9000 $18,057.30 7.21% 
10 75 male $10,000 $20,196.18 7.28% 
 
 The Date-Aligned Method is Practical 
 
In short, a survivor fund could use the date-aligned method 
to include investors with different ages, genders, and 
investment levels.  That means that an investment company 
could succeed in offering just a few survivor funds each month 
(or quarter).  For example, an investment company could offer 
a handful of 10-year survivor funds each month where each 
fund invests in a specific type of assets, such as government 
bonds, corporate bonds, large cap stocks, small cap stocks, and 
so on.  Each of these survivor funds would be open to investors 
of any age, gender, or investment level, and an investor could 
choose to invest in one or more of the funds.  With only a 
handful of funds created each month (or quarter), the number 
of investors in each fund should be reasonably high, and the 
administrative costs incurred by the investment company 
should be relatively low. 
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It turns out that there is another huge advantage to 
having a survivor fund use the date-aligned method: more 
predictable investment outcomes.  Again, we will have to delve 
into the world of statistics to see why. 
Recall that in Part III above, we showed how to calculate 
the 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range for a survivor fund 
that used the individual-cohort method.  In that example, 100 
65-year-old men each invested $1000 in a survivor fund that 
held 10-year zero coupon bonds with a 5% yield to maturity, 
and the mortality rates of those 100 men were taken from the 
2010 Social Security area population mortality table in 
Appendix Table 1.  For that hypothetical 100-man, individual-
cohort survivor fund, we calculated that: 1) the projected 
mortality-gain distribution would be $448.51;96 and 2) there 
would be a 95% probability that the actual mortality-gain 
distribution that a survivor received would be between $251 
and $692.97  We also explained that the 95% range for that 
would be narrower if that individual-cohort survivor fund had a 
larger number of investors, but because of the requirement 
that all investors in that individual-cohort survivor fund had to 
be 65-year-old males willing to invest exactly $1000, we 
thought that it would be difficult to attract a greater number of 
identical investors.98 
On the other hand, if a survivor fund instead used the 
date-aligned method, the survivor fund could be open to 
investors of any age, gender, or investment level, and that 
would make it easier to attract a large number of investors.  
With more investors, the 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range 
would be narrower.  To be sure, it is not feasible to calculate 
the 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range for a survivor fund 
that uses the date-aligned method and has investors of 
different ages, genders, or investment levels; the analytic 
formulas are hopelessly complex.  It is, however, possible to 
simulate such a date-aligned survivor fund and to measure the 
95%-mortality-gain-distribution range that results from 
repeated simulations, which is what we did instead. 
 
96.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  
97.  See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
98.  See supra the discussion accompanying Figure 4. 
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Specifically, we simulated a simple, multi-cohort survivor 
fund with 1000 male investors, 100 at each age from 65 
through 74.  We again assumed that each man invested $1000 
in the survivor fund and that the survivor fund invested all 
those contributions in 10-year zero coupon bonds with a 5% 
yield to maturity.  We again used the mortality rates implied 
by the 2010 Social Security area population mortality table in 
Appendix Table 1.  We ran 1000 simulations using the date-
aligned method to reallocate the mortality losses of those who 
died during the 10-year survivor-fund terms of those 1000 
simulations, and the results for all ten cohorts are listed in 
Appendix Table 2A.  For the 65-year-old men, the average 
mortality-gain distribution over the simulation runs was 
$449.26 (see column 6 of Appendix Table 2A), which is very 
close to the projected mortality-gain distribution of $448.49 
(see column 5 of Appendix Table 2A).99  The 95%-mortality-
gain-distribution range for these men was from $395 to $505, 
meaning that 95% of the time, the actual mortality-gain 
distribution that a survivor received was between $395 and 
$505 (see columns 7 and 8 of Appendix Table 2A).100  This is a 
much narrower 95% mortality-gain-distribution range than the 
$251 to $692 range that we calculated would be experienced by 
the 100 65-year-old men in hypothetical, individual-cohort 
survivor fund that we developed in Part I above.101 
Thus, both the date-aligned and the individual-cohort 
method produce average mortality-gain distributions that are 
close to the projected mortality-gain distribution of $448.49.102  
This is not surprising, since both methods are designed to be 
fair.  Where they differ, however, is in their variability, i.e., in 
the 95% mortality-gain-distribution range that investors would 
experience. 
 
99.  See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  There is a two-cent 
difference in the projected value listed here ($448.49) and there ($448.51) due 
to rounding of the intermediate calculations. 
100.  In each simulation run, 100 65-year-old men were alive at the start 
of the 10-year period, for a total of 100 × 1000 = 100,000 initial investors over 
the 1000 simulation runs.  A total of 78,454 of these survived the 10-year 
period.  Of those who survived, 74,531 = 0.95 × 78,454 (95%) received a 
mortality-gain distribution in the range from $395 to $505. 
101.  See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
102.  See supra note 99. 
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An insightful way to compare that variability is to ask: 
what size of an individual cohort would produce a 95%-
mortality-gain-distribution range that matched what a member 
would experience with the date-aligned method?  It turns out 
that it is fairly easy to calculate this equivalent-individual-
cohort size for each cohort in our date-aligned-method 
simulations.103  For example, for the 100 65-year-old men in our 
multi-cohort, date-aligned-method simulation, the equivalent-
individual-cohort-method size would be 1,572 (see column 9 of 
Appendix Table 2A).104  Similarly, for the 100 74-year-old men, 
the equivalent-individual-cohort size would be 762 (see column 
9 of Appendix Table 2A). 
The equivalent-individual-cohort size shows how much less 
variance the date-aligned method produces compared to the 
individual-cohort method.  The advantage is greatest for the 
100 65-year-old men—if they were removed from the multi-
cohort date-aligned survivor fund and placed in an individual-
cohort survivor fund, they would need to increase the number 
of investors by a factor of about 15.7 in order to enjoy a 95%-
mortality-gain-distribution range as narrow as they would 
experience with the date-aligned fund.105  That would be a huge 
 
103.  Determining the equivalent-individual-cohort size in this manner 
uses trial-and-error.  We try a specific cohort size, calculate the 95% range 
that would result from using the individual-cohort method, and then measure 
the percentage of simulation results that lie within this calculated range.  If 
the percentage is greater than 95.45%, we know the cohort size we tried is too 
small, and we try a larger size.  Conversely, if the percentage is less than 
95.45%, we know the cohort size we tried is too large, and we try a smaller 
size.  With this approach we can quickly determine the cohort size which 
produces the 95% range in which exactly 95.45% of the simulation results lie. 
104.  In a group of 1572 65-year-old men, the mean number of deaths is 
339.39 = 1572 × 0.2159, and the standard deviation of the number of deaths 
is 16.31 = 1572 × 0.2159 × (1 – 0.2159)) 0.5.  Two standard deviations below 
the mean is 306.77 = 339.39 – (2 × 16.31), for a lower mortality gain of 
$394.94 = 306.77/(1572 – 306.77) × $1628.89. Two standard deviations above 
the mean is 372.01 = 339.39 + (2 × 16.31), for an upper mortality-gain 
distribution of $504.97 = 372.01/(1,572 – 372.01) × $1628.89.  Thus the 95% 
range (95.45% probability) for the mortality-gain distributions using the 
individual-cohort method is from $394.94 to $504.97.  When we examine the 
date-aligned simulation results, we find that 95.45% of the age-65 survivors 
in the simulations received a mortality credit between $394.94 and $504.97.  
Thus, the simulation results have an equivalent-individual-cohort size of 
1572. 
105.  15.72 = 1572/100. 
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increase in the required number of identical investors.  The 
advantage of the date-aligned method decreases with age, 
being the least for the 74-year-old men—they would need to 
increase the number of investors by a factor of just 7.6 in order 
to enjoy a 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range as narrow as 
they would experience with the date-aligned fund.106  Still, even 
that would be a very large increase in the required number of 
identical investors. 
Summing the equivalent-individual-cohort sizes for all of 
the individual-cohorts works out to a total of 11,109 equivalent 
investors in ten individual-cohort funds—about 11.1 times 
more than the 1000 investors we would have in the single, 
multi-cohort date-aligned fund (see column 9 of Appendix Table 
2A).107  This equivalent-individual-cohort size comparison 
illustrates the motivation for using the date-aligned method 
rather than the individual-cohort method: the date-aligned 
method would result in a narrow 95%-mortality-gain-
distribution range using far fewer investors (here, a similar 
95% range using a number of investors that is an order of 
magnitude smaller).108 
Accordingly, the date-aligned method would also result in a 
narrow 95%-yield-to-maturity range using far fewer investors 
(see columns 11 and 12 of Appendix Table 2A).  For example, 
while both date-aligned and individual-cohort survivor funds 
would produce projected yields to maturity for 65-year-old men 
of 7.58% (see column 10 of Appendix Table 2A),109 the multi-
cohort date-aligned survivor fund would do so with much less 
variance per investor.  For example, while the 100 65-year-old 
men who invested in our hypothetical 1000-man, multi-cohort 
 
106.  7.62 = 762/100. 
107.  11.11 = 11,109/1000. 
108.  Of course, everything said here is specific to our example 
population.  The results would be different for different population groups.  
Still, if we have a diverse population with many different cohorts, it is clear 
that a single survivor fund using the date-aligned method would provide 
investors with a 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range that is much 
narrower than they could get with multiple separate survivor funds using the 
individual-cohort method. 
109.  See also supra note 63 and accompanying text.  There is a small 
difference in the projected yield to maturity here ($7.58%) and there (7.59%) 
due to rounding of intermediate calculations. 
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date-aligned fund experienced a 95%-yield-to-maturity range 
from 7.3% to 7.9% in our simulations (see columns 11 and 12 of 
Appendix Table 2B), in Part I above, we calculated that 100 65-
year-old men who invested in a free-standing, 100-man 
individual-cohort fund would experience a much larger 95%-
yield-to-maturity range of from 6.5% to 8.8%.110  As investment 
companies that market survivor funds would want to advertise 
predictable outcomes and small 95%-yield-to-maturity ranges 
for their products,111 we expect that those companies would 
certainly prefer using the date-aligned method to the 
individual-cohort method. 
 
 Process All the Deaths at the Same Time: The Rough-
Justice Method 
 
Before moving on, it is worth considering another possible 
method that a survivor fund could use to reallocate the account 
forfeitures of dying members.  Instead of processing deaths one 
at a time and in the order that they occurred, we might process 
all of the deaths at one time with a single transfer.  We call this 
the “rough-justice method” as it is not as nuanced as the date-
aligned method. 
Recall that in Table 5 in Part I.B above, we hypothesized 
that ten men of different ages each invested $1000 (ci) in a 
survivor fund that invested in zero coupon bonds that matured 
in ten years, and that the value of each man’s account at 
maturity (si) was $1628.89.  We then used the date-aligned 
method and the death probabilities (qi) from the 2010 Social 
Security area population mortality table in Appendix Table 1 to 
calculate fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) that were used to 
reallocate the accounts of member 3 who died at time 3.33 and 
then of member 7 who died at time 6.67, and Table 8 showed 
the final results. 
 
110.  Again, in our examples, it would take 15.7 times as many 65-year-
old men in the individual-cohort survivor fund to have a 95%-yield-to-
mortality range as narrow as what we found in the date-aligned survivor 
fund.  See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
111.  See supra Part I. 
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With that reminder about how the date-aligned method 
works, we can now use the same hypothetical facts to show how 
to design a survivor fund that instead makes a single, 
simultaneous reallocation of the amounts in the accounts of 
both dying members 3 and 7.  For reasons that will become 
apparent later in this subpart, we call this the rough-justice 
method, and it is essentially the method used by the College 
Retirement Equity Fund (CREF)112 and by the Group Self 
Annuity (GSA)113 to determine annuity payouts. 
For example, Table 10 shows another 10-man survivor 
fund like the one in Table 5 above.  We again assume that each 
member (i) has invested $1000 (ci) in the survivor fund, that 
the ten men are different ages (see column 2 of Table 10), and 
that the survivor fund invests in zero coupon bonds that 
mature in ten years with a 5% yield to maturity for a final 
value at maturity for each member of $1628.89 (si) (see column 
4 of Table 10).  The survivor fund again starts at time 0, and 
nothing happens until the end of the 10-year survivor-fund 
term.  At that time, this survivor fund will use the rough-
justice method to reallocate the balances in the accounts of the 
members who died before time 10 among the survivors, and 
here is how it works: 
 
112.  See, e.g., Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 798.  
“Basically, within each investment account, CREF periodically adjusts 
annuity payments so that the present value of the aggregate amount 
expected to be paid out over the participants’ remaining lifetimes matches 
the current value of the assets in the [CREF] account.”  Id.  At the time of 
adjustment, each participant’s annuity payment is scaled by a factor common 
to all participants, that factor chosen to make the aggregate expected payout 
match the value of assets.  “If participants in the fund ‘live longer . . . than 
expected, the amount payable to each will be less than if they as a group die 
sooner than expected.’”  Id. (citations omitted).  
113.  See generally John Piggott, Emiliano A. Valdez & Bettina Detzel, 
The Simple Analytics of a Pooled Annuity Fund, 72 J. RISK & INS. 497 (2005). 
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Table 10. The Start of a Survivor Fund with Ten Members of 
Different Ages, Rough-justice Method 
Member 
(i) 
Age 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Account 
Value 
at 
Maturity 
(si) 
Probability 
of 
Surviving 
10 Years 
(su10i) 
Expected 
Ending 
Account 
Balance 
for the 
Survivors 
(ebei) 
1 65 male $1628.89 0.784105 $2077.39 
2 66 male $1628.89 0.766628 $2124.75 
3 67 male $1628.89 0.747630 $2178.74 
4 68 male $1628.89 0.727023 $2240.49 
5 69 male $1628.89 0.704772 $2311.23 
6 70 male $1628.89 0.680785 $2392.66 
7 71 male $1628.89 0.654951 $2487.04 
8 72 male $1628.89 0.627143 $2597.32 
9 73 male $1628.89 0.597364 $2726.80 
10 74 male $1628.89 0.565667 $2879.59 
 
For each member, we calculated the probability of 
surviving ten years until the survivor fund ends (su10i) using 
the 2010 Social Security area population mortality table in 
Appendix Table 1.  For example, column 5 of Table 10 suggests 
that the 65-year-old male has a 78.41% chance of living ten 
years and reaching aged 75 (su101 = 0.784105); put differently, 
he has a 21.59% probability of dying before the survivor fund 
ends (10-year death probability, q101 = 0.215895 = 1 – 
0.784105).114  On the other hand, the 74-year-old has only a 
56.57% chance of living ten years to age 84 (and a 43.43% 10-
year death probability) (see column 5 of Table 10). 
Finally, column 6 of Table 10 shows the projected ending 
account balance (ebei) that each member could anticipate if he 
survived to the end of the 10-year survivor fund and if the 
actual mortality experience of the members of the survivor 
fund comported with the 2010 Social Security area population 
mortality table in Appendix Table 1.  For example, if our 
 
114.  See supra notes 53, 59 and accompanying text. 
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hypothetical 65-year-old man lives ten years to age 75, he could 
expect to collect $2077.39 (see column 6 of Table 10).115 
As we did in explaining the date-aligned method, we again 
assume that two members of the survivor fund would die over 
the 10-year survivor-fund term: member 3 would die at time 
3.33 and member 7 would die at time 6.67, and each would lose 
the $1628.89 in his account at time 10.116  Under the rough-
justice method, at time 10, the total amount $16,288.90 in the 
survivor fund ($16,288.90 = $1628.89 × 10) would be 
simultaneously split among the eight surviving members in 
proportion to each survivor’s expected ending account balance 
(ebei) (see column 6 of Table 10); Table 11 shows the results. 
 
115.  More precisely, the expected ending account balance is the amount 
a survivor would expect to collect if he participated in an individual-cohort 
survivor fund whose actual mortality experience comported with the 2010 
Social Security area population mortality table in Appendix Table 1.  For the 
65-year-old, 78.4105% of the members in an individual-cohort fund would 
survive, so each survivor would receive $2077.39 = $1628.89/0.784105.  For 
the 74-year-old, 56.5667% of the members in an individual-cohort fund would 
survive, so each survivor would receive $2879.59 = $1628.89/0.565667. 
116.  Since member 3 was 67 at time 0, he was 70.33 at time 3.33 (70.33 
= 67 + 3.33).  Similarly, since member 7 was 71 at time 0, he was 77.67 at 
time 6.67 (77.67 = 71 + 6.67). 
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Table 11. The End of a Ten-man Survivor Fund with Eight 
Survivors of Different Ages, Rough-justice Method 
Membe
r 
(i) 
Age 
(xi) 
Gende
r 
(gi) 
Account 
Value 
at 
Maturit
y 
(si) 
 
Mortality 
Gain or 
(Loss) 
(mgi) 
Ending 
Account 
Balance 
(bei) 
Yield to 
Maturit
y 
(yi) 
1 75 male $1628.89 
 
$119.84 $1748.73 5.75% 
2 76 male $1628.89 
 
$159.71 $1788.60 5.99% 
3 dead@70.33 male 
$1628.8
9 
 ($1628.8
9) $0.00 n/a 
4 78 male $1628.89 
 
$257.14 $1886.03 6.55% 
5 79 male $1628.89 
 
$316.69 $1945.58 6.88% 
6 80 male $1628.89 
 
$385.24 $2014.13 7.25% 
7 dead@77.67 male 
$1628.8
9 
 ($1628.8
9) $0.00 n/a 
8 82 male $1628.89 
 
$557.52 $2186.41 8.14% 
9 83 male $1628.89 
 
$666.51 $2295.40 8.66% 
10 84 male $1628.89 
 
$795.13 $2424.02 9.26% 
 
At the outset, Column 6 of Table 11 shows the ending 
account balance (bei) for each of the ten members.  For 
example, member 1’s ending account balance (be1; i.e., his share 
of the $16,288.90 total fund amount) is $1748.73, computed as 
follows: 
be1= $16288.90 × ebe1 /(ebe1 + ebe2 + ebe4 + ebe5 + ebe6 + ebe8 
+ ebe9 + ebe10) 
= $16288.90 × $2077.39/($2077.39 + $2124.75+ 
$2240.49 + $2311.23 + $2392.66 + $2597.32 + $2726.80 
+ $2879.59) 
= $1748.73. 
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Next, column 5 of Table 11 shows the mortality gains and 
losses (mgi) for the ten members.117  For example, member 1’s 
mortality-gain distribution (mg1) is $119.84, computed as 
follows: 
mg1= be1 – s1 
= $1748.73 – $1628.89 
= $119.84. 
Finally, column 7 of Table 11 shows that all eight survivors 
have higher yields to maturity (yi) than the 5% yield to 
maturity on the underlying zero coupon bonds. 
The problem with the rough-justice method is that it does 
not treat all members fairly, at least not exactly.  Recall that in 
Part I.B above, we showed that in a survivor fund with 
members of different ages, a dying member’s account should be 
distributed to the surviving members in portions that are 
carefully chosen to provide fair bets for all investors; that is, 
the distribution should be made according to a fair transfer-
plan.  We then showed how the date-aligned method—which 
processes deaths one at a time and in the order that they occur, 
using a fair transfer plan at each death—provided fair bets for 
members of different ages. 
On the other hand, the rough-justice method—which 
processes all of the deaths at once without using a fair transfer-
plan—injects a small bias that favors certain ages over 
others.118  Indeed, that is why we call it the rough-justice 
method.  The bias inherent in the rough-justice method has not 
been studied extensively and is not well understood.119  In 
simulations that we ran (but which are not presented here), we 
 
117.  These mortality gains and losses are provided largely for 
comparison sake.  Under the rough-justice method, these mortality gains and 
losses do not have to be computed in order to get to a member’s ending 
account balance (bei).  Instead, the rough-justice method computes the ending 
account balances (bei) directly and finds the mortality-gain distributions 
indirectly (by subtracting the account value at maturity (si) from that 
member’s ending account balance (bei)). 
118.  The rough-justice method would also inject a small bias when 
investors differ in other ways, for example, if they had invested different 
amounts. 
119.  As far as we know, there are only two mentions of this bias in the 
literature: Sabin, Fair Tontine Annuity, supra note 12, at Appendix I; 
Catherine Donnelly, Actuarial Fairness and Solidarity in Pooled Annuity 
Funds, 45 ASTIN BULL. 49 (2015). 
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found that the age bias inherent in the rough-justice method 
dropped quickly as the number of members in the survivor 
fund increased, and the bias was negligible once there were at 
least a few hundred members.  Catherine Donnelly performed 
comparable simulations and reported similar findings.120  All in 
all, these findings suggest that in funds with many hundreds or 
thousands of members (like those run by TIAA-CREF), the bias 
inherent in the rough-justice method largely disappears. 
 
III. THE TROUBLE WITH MORTALITY TABLES 
 
Mortality is what makes a survivor fund a survivor fund.  
There are several ways that a survivor fund typically takes 
mortality into account.  First, and most obviously, investors 
who die during the term of the survivor-fund lose their 
investments.  Second, reallocations occur only if at least some 
investors in the survivor fund actually do die during the 
survivor-fund term.  Third, investment companies will 
inevitably use mortality tables to project the yields to maturity 
that investors could anticipate.121  Finally, we note that when 
an investor in a survivor fund does die, under the date-aligned 
method we described in Part II above, the balance in her 
account would be reallocated to the survivors based on fair-
transfer-plan weights (wi) that would be based on the 
mortality-table death probabilities of all of the members who 
competed in the survivor fund at the time of that member’s 
death.122  This Part discusses which mortality tables survivor 
funds should use when mortality projections are needed. 
 
  
 
120.  See Donnelly, supra note 119. 
121.  See, supra Part I.   
122.  See, supra Part I.B.  On the other hand, infra Part IV, shows an 
alternative method for making fair transfer-plan distributions that is based 
entirely on the actual mortality experience of the investors rather than on 
projections from a mortality table. 
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A. The Role of Mortality Tables in an Individual-
Cohort Survivor Fund 
 
At the outset, consider an individual-cohort survivor fund 
that consists of 1000 65-year-old men that each invest $1000 in 
a 10-year survivor fund that invests in 10-year zero coupon 
bonds with a 5% yield to maturity.  Recall that in Part III, 
above, we described how to calculate both the projected 
mortality-gain distribution and the 95%-mortality-gain-
distribution range for such an individual-cohort survivor fund.  
We used the 2010 Social Security area population mortality 
table in Appendix Table 1 to calculate that each hypothetical 
65-year-old man would have a 21.59% probability of dying 
during the 10-year term of the survivor fund (see row 1, column 
2 of Table 12).123  Accordingly, we would expect that 215.9 of 
our 1000 65-year-old men would die before reaching age 75 (see 
row 2 of Table 12),124 and that the 784.1 survivors could each 
expect to receive a projected mortality-gain distribution of 
$448.51 (see row 5 of Table 12).125  The actual number of deaths 
would follow a normal distribution with a mean of 215.9 (see 
row 2 of Table 12) and a standard deviation of 13.01 (see row 3 
of Table 12), and it follows that the 95% range of the actual 
number of deaths would be from 189.88 to 241.92 (see row 4 of 
Table 12), for a 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range from 
$381.79 to $519.81 (see row 6 of Table 12).126  Finally, the 
projected yield to maturity for each survivor would be 7.59% 
(see row 7 of Table 12), and the 95%-yield-to-maturity range 
would be from 7.23% to 7.95% (see row 8 of Table 12).127 
 
123.  See supra note 53. 
124.  215.9 = 1000 × 21.59.  See supra note 59. 
125.  $448.51 = ($1,628.89 × 215.9)/784.1.  See supra note 59. 
126.  See supra note 66. 
127.  Id. 
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Table 12. Forecast of Outcomes for an Individual-Cohort 
Survivor Fund, Based on Mortality-Table Death Probability 
and True Death Probability 
 Mortality Table True Mortality 
Probability of death 21.59% 15.00% 
Mean number of deaths 215.9 150.0 
Standard deviation of deaths 13.01 11.29 
95% range of deaths 189.88 – 241.92 127.42 – 172.58   
Projected mortality gain $448.51 $287.45 
95%-mortality-gain-distribution 
range 
$381.79 – 
$519.81 
$237.86 – 
$339.75 
Projected yield to maturity 7.59% 6.72% 
95% y=Yield-to-maturity range 7.23% – 7.95% 6.44% – 7.01%  
 
But what if our 1000 65-year-old male investors are 
actually healthier than those in the 2010 Social Security area 
population mortality table in Appendix Table 1?  For example, 
imagine that the investors’ true 10-year death probability is 
only 15.00%, not 21.59% (see row 1, column 3 of Table 12).  
Then, the projected number of deaths in the group would be 
only 150.0, not 215.9 (see row 2 of Table 12),128 and the 
standard deviation of the number of deaths would be 11.29, not 
13.0 (see row 3 of Table 12).129  The projected 850 survivors 
could each expect to receive a projected mortality-gain 
distribution of just $287.45, not $448.51 (see row 5 of Table 
12),130 and their 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range would 
also be smaller—just $237.86 to $339.75 (see row 6 of Table 
12).131  All in all, the 850 survivors’ projected yield to maturity 
would be just 6.72% (see row 7 of Table 12),132 and their 95%-
 
128.  150.0 = 1000 × 15.00%. 
129.  11.29159 = (1000 × 0.1500 × (1 – 0.1500))0.5. 
130.  $287.45 = ($1,628.89 × 150.0)/850.0. 
131.  Two standard deviations below the mean number of deaths is 
127.42 = 150.0 – (2 × 11.29), for a lower mortality-gain distribution of $237.86 
= $1628.89 × 127.42/(1000 – 127.42).  Two standard deviations above the 
mean number of deaths is 172.58 = 150.0 + (2 × 11.29), for an upper 
mortality-gain distribution of $339.75 = $1628.89 × 172.58/(1000 – 172.58).   
132.  6.72035% = (($1628.89 + $287.45)/$1000.00)0.1 – 1. 
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yield-to-maturity range would be just 6.44% to 7.01% (see row 
8 of Table 12).133 
This example illustrates the importance of choosing the 
correct mortality table for an individual-cohort survivor fund, 
as the accuracy of the forecast of projected investment greatly 
depends on how accurately the mortality table represents the 
true probability of death for that particular group of investors.  
In the hypothetical example in Table 12, the death 
probabilities from the 2010 Social Security area population 
mortality table in column 2 of Table 12 overstated the true 
death probabilities of the actual investors in the survivor fund 
(21.59% versus 15.00%).  As a result, the projected yield to 
maturity looked more favorable than it truly was (7.59% versus 
6.72%), and the 95%-yield-to-maturity range also looked more 
favorable than it truly was (7.23% to 7.95%, versus 6.44% to 
7.01%).  A surviving investor in this fund would likely be 
disappointed with the investment company’s projections, as he 
would have anticipated a yield to maturity of around 7.59%, 
but he would likely have ended up with a yield to maturity of 
around 6.72%. 
This example shows how important it is for an investment 
company to choose the correct mortality table—that is, one that 
can reasonably be expected to match the actual mortality 
experience of the actual investors in the particular survivor 
fund offered. 
 
B. The Even Greater Importance of Selecting the 
Correct Mortality Table when a Survivor Fund 
Includes Investors of Different Ages 
 
Choosing the correct mortality table is even more 
important when a survivor fund includes investors of different 
ages and uses the date-aligned method to reallocate forfeitures.  
As we saw in Part I.B above, when a survivor fund uses the 
date-aligned method, the transfer-plan weights (wi) used to 
reallocate the accounts of the investors of different ages who 
 
133.  6.44092% = (($1628.89 + $237.86)/$1000.00)0.1 – 1; 7.00809% = 
(($1628.89 + $339.75)/$1000.00)0.1 – 1. 
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die during the term of the survivor-fund would be based on the 
differing death probabilities (qi) of those investors.  Of course, 
those death probabilities would be based on the mortality table 
selected by the investment company that offered the survivor 
fund.  If the survivor fund used a different mortality table, the 
transfer-plan weights (wi) used to reallocate the accounts of the 
investors who died during the term of the survivor-fund would 
change, and that would change the actual mortality-gain-
distribution amounts that the surviving investors would 
receive.  This result is in sharp contrast to what happens with 
a survivor fund that uses the individual-cohort method: for a 
survivor fund that uses the individual-cohort method, the 
mortality table only affects the projected mortality-gain 
distribution to be received by the survivors, not the actual 
mortality-gain distributions that they receive, as the mortality 
table plays no role in how the accounts of investors who die are 
actually reallocated.  In short, when a survivor fund with 
members of different ages uses the date-aligned method, the 
mortality table selected affects both the projected mortality-
gain distributions and the actual mortality-gain distributions 
that members would receive would receive; and here is a more 
detailed explanation: 
Recall that in Part II above, we described a hypothetical 
survivor fund in which there were 1000 male investors, 100 at 
each age from 65 to 74.  Each invested $1000 in 10-year zero 
coupon bonds with a 5% yield to maturity.  We ran 1000 
simulations of that survivor fund, using the date-aligned 
method to reallocate the forfeitures of those who died during 
the 10-year period.  In those simulation results, we found that 
the average mortality-gain distribution received by a survivor 
was nearly identical to the projected mortality gain that he 
would have experienced in an individual-cohort fund.  We also 
found that the 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range that a 
survivor experienced in the simulations was much narrower 
than the 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range that he would 
have experienced had his cohort been placed in its own 
individual-cohort survivor fund.  In those simulations, the 
simulated death times for each investor were randomly picked 
using probabilities taken from the 2010 Social Security area 
population mortality table in Appendix Table 1.  In other 
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words, we simulated the case where the 2010 Social Security 
area population mortality table accurately reflected the death 
probabilities for the investor population.  Had we instead 
simulated a case with a mortality table that was inaccurate for 
the investor population, for example, by simulating death times 
for each investor using probabilities taken from a mortality 
table that assumed that the investor population was healthier 
(or sicker) than the death probabilities in the 2010 Social 
Security area population mortality table, the results for each 
cohort’s mortality-gain distributions would have been different.  
Some cohorts would have received larger mortality-gain 
distributions than they would have if the fair-transfer-plan 
weights (wi) had been based on the true mortality table, and 
some cohorts would have received smaller mortality-gain 
distributions. 
This illustrates the greater role of mortality tables when 
the date-aligned method is used to accommodate investors of 
different ages in a single survivor fund.  The date-aligned 
method allows the fund to claim that each cohort of investors 
enjoys a better experience than it would if it were placed in its 
own individual-cohort fund.  That is because a cohort’s 
projected mortality-gain distribution would be the same as if it 
had been placed in its own individual-cohort fund, but the 95%-
mortality-gain-distribution range and the 95%-yield-to-
maturity range would be much narrower.  However, that 
“better-experience-with-a-date-aligned-survivor-fund” claim is 
only valid if the mortality table used to calculate the fair 
transfer-plan weights accurately represents the true death 
probabilities of the investors in the survivor fund.  If the 
mortality table that is relied upon by a date-aligned survivor 
fund does not accurately represent the actual death 
probabilities of its investor population, then some cohorts 
would do better if placed in an individual-cohort fund, and 
some would do worse.  Pertinent here, the next subpart of this 
Article discusses what the correct mortality table to use is. 
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C. What is the Correct Mortality Table to Use? 
 
So far, when we have needed to use a mortality table, we 
have used the 2010 Social Security area population mortality 
table in Appendix Table 1.  That table is certainly a good 
starting point as it offers pretty good estimates of the life 
expectancies and death probabilities of average Americans 
today.  Unfortunately, it probably does not represent the 
population of people who would actually invest in survivor 
funds. 
We expect that the individuals who would actually buy into 
survivor funds would likely be healthier and live longer than 
the average Americans in the 2010 Social Security area 
population mortality table.  Accordingly, survivor funds should 
use a mortality table that takes that “healthiness” moral 
hazard into account.134  Pertinent here, we reiterate that U.S. 
securities laws require that investment companies provide 
accurate information to investors and that using an incorrect 
mortality table for a given population of investors would result 
in inaccurate projected (and advertised) yields to maturity and 
95%-mortality-gain-distribution ranges.135 
In that regard, we know that people who voluntarily 
purchase annuities tend to live longer than those who do not.136  
As there is every reason to believe that survivor funds would 
also attract more healthy investors than unhealthy ones,137 it 
would be more appropriate to estimate the projected mortality-
gain distributions from a survivor fund—and hence the 
projected yields to maturity—using a mortality table for the 
 
134.  See Moral Hazard, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moralhazard.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 
2016) (defining “moral hazard” as “the risk that a party to a transaction has 
not entered into the contract in good faith, has provided misleading 
information about its assets, liabilities or credit capacity, or has an incentive 
to take unusual risks in a desperate attempt to earn a profit before the 
contract settles”). 
135.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
136.  Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 800-01. 
137.  People who think they will live a long time would have every 
reason to invest in a survivor fund, while people who think they are on their 
death bed would not. 
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healthy population, rather than a mortality table for the entire 
population. 
While this Article does not offer any suggestions about 
which specific mortality table would be the correct one for a 
given survivor fund to use, Appendix Table 3 does compare the 
death probabilities for males in the 2010 Social Security area 
population mortality table in Appendix Table 1 with two 
plausible alternatives.  The first set of alternative death 
probability estimates in Appendix Table 3 is from the Society of 
Actuaries (i.e., the so-called RP-2014 Mortality Tables for 
retirement plans),138 and the second set of estimates is from the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners [NAIC]) (i.e., 
the so-called 2012 Individual Annuity Mortality Period Life 
[2012 IAM Period] Tables).139  For example, column 2 of 
Appendix Table 3 shows that a 65-year-old male in the 2010 
Social Security area population had a 1.6% death probability (qi 
= 0.015927).  On the other hand, column 4 of Appendix Table 3 
shows that a healthy 65-year-old male annuitant in the Society 
of Actuaries’ RP-2014 mortality table had a death probability of 
just 1.1% (qi = 0.011013).  Similarly, column 6 of Appendix 
Table 3 shows that a 65-year-old male in the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners’ 2012 IAM Period 
Table had a death probability of just 0.8% (qi = 0.008106). 
All in all, the lower death probabilities associated with 
healthier investors suggest fewer deaths over the term of any 
survivor fund and, therefore, lower projected yields to maturity 
for survivors.  Accordingly, in order to provide accurate 
 
138.  RP-2014 Rates; Total Dataset, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES (2014), 
https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Exp-Study/research-2014-rp-mort-tab-
rates.xlsx. See also RP-2014 Mortality Tables Report 5 n.2, SOC’Y OF 
ACTUARIES (Nov. 2014), https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Exp-
Study/research-2014-rp-report.pdf; American Academy of Actuaries Pension 
Committee, Selecting and Documenting Mortality Assumptions for Pensions, 
AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES (June 2015), 
http://actuary.org/files/Mortality_PN_060515_0.pdf. 
139.  NAIC Model Rule for Recognizing a New Annuity Mortality Table 
for Use in Determining Reserve Liabilities for Annuities, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMMISSIONERS (Jan. 2013), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-821.pdf 
[hereinafter NAIC Model Rule]. The 2012 Individual Annuity Reserving 
(IAR) Mortality Tables are designed for use in determining the minimum 
standard of valuation for individual annuity or pure endowment contracts 
issued after the effective date of the rule.  Id. at § 4.D. 
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information to prospective investors, survivor funds in the real 
world would need to use mortality tables that would correctly 
project the actual mortality experience that would be expected 
from their investor populations.140 
 
IV. ANOTHER FAIR DESIGN: THE AGE-ALIGNED 
METHOD 
 
In Part I.B above we showed how a survivor fund that was 
open to investors of different ages (and genders) could use the 
date-aligned method to take age (and gender) into account by 
using the death probabilities (qi) from a mortality table to 
determine the fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) needed to make 
fair reallocations.  As Part III showed, however, there are real 
challenges involved in selecting the correct mortality table for 
the population of investors covered by a survivor fund.  In this 
Part, we show that a survivor fund would not have to rely on a 
mortality table to reallocate mortality losses.  Instead, it could 
use the so-called “age-aligned method” to base reallocations 
only on actual mortality experience.141 
 
 
140.  While life expectancies and death probabilities change over time, 
this should not be much of an issue for the short-term survivor funds that we 
discuss in this Article.  For long-term funds, however, it might be necessary 
for survivor-fund designers to build in a rule about whether to stay with the 
original mortality table or to change mortality tables as newer versions 
become available.  See, e.g., Felicitie C. Bell & Michael L. Miller, Life Tables 
for the United States Social Security Area 1900-2100, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 14 
fig.4a (2005), http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/pdf_studies/study120.pdf; 
Jonathan Barry Forman & Yung-Ping Chen, Optimal Retirement Age, N.Y.U. 
REV. OF BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. § 14.02 (2008), 
http://retirement2020.soa.org/Files/washington-forman-opt.pdf (outlining the 
effect of increased life expectancy on current pension plans).  See also 
Mortality Improvement Scale MP-2015, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES (2015), 
https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Exp-Study/research-2015-mp-report.pdf 
(presenting the Retirement Plans Experience Committees’ update to the 
Mortality Improvement Scale MP-2014 that was released in Oct. 2014). 
141.  While the age-aligned method would result in different 
reallocations than those made by the date-aligned method, as this Part will 
show, the age-aligned method is also based on a fair transfer-plan. 
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A. How the Age-Aligned Method Works 
 
As an initial matter, again recall that in Table 5 in Part 
I.B above, we hypothesized that ten men of different ages each 
invested $1000 (ci) in a survivor fund that invested in zero 
coupon bonds that matured in ten years and that the value of 
each man’s account at maturity (si) was $1628.89.  We then 
used the date-aligned method and the death probabilities (qi) 
from the 2010 Social Security area population mortality table 
in Appendix Table 1 to calculate fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) 
that were used to reallocate the accounts of member 3 who died 
at time 3.33, and then of member 7 who died at time 6.67, and 
Table 8 showed the final results. 
With that reminder about how the date-aligned method 
worked, we can now use the same hypothetical example to 
show how to design a survivor fund that would also be fair to 
members of different ages but that would not use information 
from any mortality table to reallocate forfeitures.  We call this 
the age-aligned method, and here is how it works: 
Again, nothing happens until the end of the 10-year 
survivor-fund term.  At that time, the survivor fund would 
again use a fair transfer-plan to reallocate the balances in the 
accounts of the members who died before time 10 among the 
survivors.  This time, however, we focus on the age of each 
death rather than the time of that death.  The key feature of 
the age-aligned method is that it processes deaths one at a time 
and from the youngest age of death to the oldest.  The method is 
easy to apply as, once again, all of the “processing of deaths” 
occurs at the end of the survivor-fund term (i.e., t = 10), and, at 
that time, we would know who had died and how old they were 
when they died. 
The key assumption of the age-aligned method is that all 
members who were alive at any given age are assumed to have 
the same force-of-mortality probability (fi) at that age.  We do 
not make any assumption about what the value of that force-of-
mortality probability would be; we only assume that it would 
be the same for all members at that age.  As a result, we will 
see that no mortality table is needed or used. 
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We again assume that member 3 died at age 70.33 and 
that member 7 died at age 77.67.  It happens that member 3 
died at time 3.33 (70.33 = 67 + 3.33) and that member 7 died at 
time 6.67 (77.67 = 71 + 6.67), but in the age-aligned method, it 
simply does not matter when members 3 and 7 died because 
the age-aligned method processes deaths based on the age of 
death (not the time of death), and from the youngest age of 
death to the oldest.  Here, for example, we would process the 
death that occurred at age 70.33 before the death that occurred 
at age 77.67, regardless of which death occurred first and which 
occurred second. 
In short, under the age-aligned method, we first determine 
the ages at which deaths occurred.  We then place those deaths 
in order from the youngest age of death to the oldest, and, 
finally, we create fair transfer-plans to reallocate the 
forfeitures that result from those deaths. 
In our hypothetical example, deaths occurred at ages 70.33 
and 77.67, and the age-aligned method would process those two 
deaths in that order.  First, we would create a fair transfer-
plan but only among the members of the survivor fund who 
could have died at age 70.33 during the 10-year term of the 
survivor fund—that is, only for members who actually reached 
age 70.33 at some time during the 10-year term of the survivor 
fund, and Table 13 shows the results after the first mortality-
gain distribution. 
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Table 13. Accounting for the First Death, Age-aligned Method 
Member 
(i) 
10-
year 
Age 
Range 
Gender 
(gi) 
Account 
Value 
at 
Maturity 
(si) 
Fair 
Transfer-
plan 
Weight 
(wi) 
Account 
Balance 
After the 
First 
Distribution 
(b1i) 
1 65-75 Male $1628.89 0.166667 $1954.67 
2 66-76 Male $1628.89 0.166667 $1954.67 
3 67-77 Male $1628.89 0.166667 $  0.00 
4 68-78 Male $1628.89 0.166667 $1954.67 
5 69-79 Male $1628.89 0.166667 $1954.67 
6 70-80 Male $1628.89 0.166667 $1954.67 
7 71-81 Male $1628.89 0 $1628.89 
8 72-82 Male $1628.89 0 $1628.89 
9 73-83 Male $1628.89 0 $1628.89 
10 74-84 Male $1628.89 0 $1628.89 
 
Only members 1 through 6 would compete in the first fair 
transfer-plan; members 7 through 10 would be excluded.  
Members 1 through 6 were younger than 70.33 at the start of 
the 10-year term of the survivor fund, and each would be older 
than 70.33 at the end of the survivor-fund term if he survives.  
Thus, it is possible that any one of those members 1 through 6 
could be the one who died at age 70.33, so each would be 
included in the first fair transfer-plan.  On the other hand, 
members 7 through 10 were all older than 70.33 when the 
survivor-fund began and so could not have died at age 70.33 
during the 10-year term of the survivor fund; accordingly, 
members 7 through 10 would be excluded from the first fair 
transfer-plan.142 
 
142.  It happens that member 3 was the one who died at age 70.33, at 
time 3.33. Readers might be puzzled by the fact that members 1 and 2 had 
not yet reached age 70.33 at time 3.33, yet they were included in the first fair 
transfer-plan.  Since the youngest age of death was, in fact, 70.33, it follows 
that members 1 and 2 must have lived past age 70.33 during the survivor-
fund term—otherwise the youngest age of death would have been less than 
70.33.  For example, if member 1 had died at time 4 when he was 69 (69 = 65 
+ 4), then his death would have been the youngest death to occur, and it 
would have triggered the very first fair transfer-plan (this time, just for 
members 1 through 5, since these were the only members who were alive at 
the age of 69 at some time during the 10-year term of the survivor-fund and 
could have been the ones who died at that age; members 6 through 10 could 
not have been the ones who died at age 69 because they were all older than 
69 when the survivor fund started).  The death of member 3 at age 70.33 
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We assume that all six of the competitors who could have 
died at age 70.33 (members 1 through 6) were equally likely to 
be the ones who, in fact, died at that age; that is, we assume 
that they each had the same force-of-mortality probability at 
that age.143  Therefore, we created the first fair transfer-plan by 
simply using the account values at maturity (si) (see column 4 
of Table 13) held by these six competitors without any 
consideration of the particular value of the force-of-mortality 
probability.  From these account values we computed the fair-
transfer-plan weights (wi) which, here, all turn out to be 
0.166667 = 1/6 (see column 5 of Table 13).  Accordingly, at time 
10, when it would be time to divide the $1628.89 in member 3’s 
account among the five surviving competitors, each of those five 
survivors would receive $325.78 = s3 × wi/(1 – w3) = $1628.89 × 
0.166667/(1 – 0.166667),144 and, of course, member 3 would 
forfeit his $1628.89.  In short, each of the five surviving 
competitors would get a mortality-gain distribution of $325.78 
and would enter the next distribution with an account balance 
after the first mortality-gain distribution (b1i) of $1954.67 (see 
column 6 of Table 13).145 
Next, we would create a second fair transfer-plan but, this 
time, only among the members of the survivor fund who could 
have died at age 77.67 during the 10-year term of the survivor 
fund—that is, only for members who actually reached age 77.67 
at some time during the 10-year term of the survivor fund, and 
Table 14 shows the results after the second mortality-gain 
distribution. 
 
would then trigger the second fair transfer-plan, and the death of member 7 
at age 77.67 would trigger a third-and-final fair transfer-plan. 
143.  To be sure, we understand that the actual force-of-mortality 
probabilities at any given age can change slightly over time.  Over the short, 
10-year terms of the survivor funds that we are talking about in this Article, 
however, we believe that the differences in force-of-mortality probabilities 
would be relatively insignificant, and, in any event, we have chosen to ignore 
those differences in this Article. 
144.  In this case, where all six competing members had the same account 
balances immediately before the first-death distribution, the result is equivalent 
to dividing up the decedent’s amount equally among the survivors ($325.78 = 
$1628.89/5), but this will not generally happen (e.g., if the competing members 
started with different account balances). 
145.  $1954.67 = $1628.89 + $325.78. 
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Table 14. Accounting for the Second Death, Age-aligned 
Method 
Member 
(i) Age Range 
Gender 
(gi) 
Account 
Balance 
After the 
First 
Distribution 
(b1i) 
 
Fair 
Transfer-
plan 
Weight 
(wi) 
Account 
Balance 
After the 
Second 
Distribution 
(b2i) 
1 65-75 Male $1954.67  0 $1954.67 
2 66-76 Male $1954.67  0 $1954.67 
3 67-dead@70.33 Male $  0.00  0 $ 0.00 
4 68-78 Male $1954.67  0.160981 $2255.82 
5 69-79 Male $1954.67  0.160981 $2255.82 
6 70-80 Male $1954.67  0.160981 $2255.82 
7 71-81 Male $1628.89  0.129264 $  0.00 
8 72-82 Male $1628.89  0.129264 $1870.71 
9 73-83 Male $1628.89  0.129264 $1870.71 
10 74-84 Male $1628.89  0.129264 $1870.71 
 
This time, the competition would be among members 4 
through 10, as these would be the only ones who could have 
died at age 77.67.  Member 3 would be excluded because he 
died before reaching age 77.67.  Members 1 and 2 would also be 
excluded as they would still be younger than age 77.67 at the 
end of the 10-year term of the survivor fund.  As we did at the 
first death, we then computed fair-transfer-plan weights (wi) 
(see column 5 of Table 14), again, assuming that each of the 
seven competitors was equally likely to be the one who died at 
age 77.67.  This time, however, the competitors do not have 
equal balances in their accounts (b1i) because some had 
benefitted from mortality-gain distributions after the first 
death and some had not (see column 4 of Table 14).146  
Accordingly, when member 7’s $1628.89 account value is 
divided among the six surviving competitors in this second fair 
transfer-plan, some would get more than others, and Column 6 
of Table 14 shows the account balances after the second 
distribution (b2i) for these seven competitors. 
 
146.  These values come from column 6 of Table 13. 
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Finally, Table 15 shows the ending account balance (bei) 
for the eight surviving members of this survivor fund (see 
column 5).147  Again, the yields to maturity (yi) for the eight 
survivors (see column 6 of Table 15) would be significantly 
higher than the 5% yield to maturity on the underlying zero 
coupon bonds. 
 
Table 15. The End of a 10-man Survivor Fund with Eight 
Survivors, Age-aligned Method 
Member 
(i) 
Age 
(xi) 
Gender 
(gi) 
Initial 
Contribution 
(ci) 
Ending 
Account 
Balance 
(bei) 
Yield to 
Maturity 
(yi) 
1 75 Male $1000 
$1954.67 6.93% 
2 76 Male $1000 
$1954.67 6.93% 
3 dead@70.33 Male $1000 
$  0.00 n/a 
4 78 Male $1000 
$2255.82 8.48% 
5 79 Male $1000 
$2255.82 8.48% 
6 80 Male $1000 
$2255.82 8.48% 
7 dead@77.67 Male $1000 
$  0.00 n/a 
8 82 Male $1000 
$1870.71 6.46% 
9 83 Male $1000 
$1870.71 6.46% 
10 84 Male $1000 
$1870.71 6.46% 
 
In short, we used the 10-member fund from Table 5 to 
show how the age-aligned method works.  Like the date-aligned 
method, the age-aligned method is fair to all ten investors. 
With such a small number of investors, however, the 
results here are somewhat noisy and anomalous.  As we saw in 
column 6 of Table 8, in a survivor fund with members of 
different ages, older survivors generally get higher yields to 
maturity than younger survivors; but here, it was “middle-
aged” members 4, 5, and 6 who got the highest yields to 
 
147.  These values come from column 6 of Table 14. 
63
 2016 SURVIVOR FUNDS 267 
maturity (see column 6 of Table 15).  The reason that the older 
survivors here did not get higher yields than the younger 
survivors has to do with our somewhat anomalous 
assumptions: we only had ten investors and we arbitrarily 
picked the two investors who died and when they died.  In the 
real world, however, we would expect that a survivor fund 
using the age-aligned method would have hundreds or 
thousands of investors.  As a result, the actual mortality 
experience of most survivor funds would be much closer to the 
mortality experience of the general population.  Accordingly, 
older survivors in such large survivor funds would, in fact, get 
higher yields to maturity than younger survivors.148 
 
B. The Age-Aligned Method is Also Quite 
Practical 
 
Like the date-aligned method, the age-aligned method is 
quite practical.  A survivor fund could use the age-aligned 
method to include investors with different ages, genders, and 
investment levels.  That again means that an investment 
company could succeed in offering just a few survivor funds 
each month (or quarter), as we saw with the date-aligned 
method.149  Again, it turns out that, for any given number of 
investors, the age-aligned method would generate more 
predictable outcomes than the individual-cohort method, 
although the outcomes would not be quite as predictable as 
they were with the date-aligned method.  We again have to 
delve into the world of statistics to explain this phenomenon. 
Recall that in Part III above, we described how to calculate 
the 95%-mortality-gain-distribution range for a survivor fund 
that used the individual-cohort method.  We posed a 
 
148.  In that regard, both Table 10 and Appendix Table 1 show that 
older individuals have higher death probabilities than younger individuals.  
For example, Table 10 suggests that while 78.4% of 65-year-old men would 
live ten years to age 75, just 56.6% of 74-year-old men would live ten years to 
age 84.  As survivor funds generally make larger mortality-gain distributions 
to survivors who have higher death probabilities, older survivors should do 
better than younger survivors. 
149.  See supra Part II. 
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hypothetical example in which 100 65-year-old men each 
invested $1000 in a survivor fund that held 10-year zero 
coupon bonds with a 5% yield to maturity and, in which, the 
mortality rates of those 100 men were taken from the 2010 
Social Security area population mortality table in Appendix 
Table 1.  We then calculated that: 1) the projected mortality-
gain distribution would be $448.49150 and 2) there would be a 
95% probability that the actual mortality-gain distribution that 
a survivor receives will be between $251 and $692.151  We also 
explained that the 95% mortality-gain-distribution range 
would be narrower if the survivor fund had a larger number of 
investors, but because of the requirement that all investors in 
that individual-cohort survivor fund had to be 65-year-old 
males willing to invest exactly $1000, we thought that it would 
be difficult to attract a greater number of identical investors.152 
On the other hand, if a survivor fund instead used the age-
aligned method, it could be open to investors of any age, 
gender, or investment level, and that would make it easier to 
attract a large number of investors.  With more investors, the 
95%-mortality-gain-distribution range would be narrower.  
Unfortunately, it is once again not feasible to calculate the 95% 
range for a survivor fund that uses the age-aligned method 
when we have investors of differing ages, genders, or 
investment levels; the analytic formulas are hopelessly 
complex, just as they were with the date-aligned method.153  
However, it is again possible to simulate our hypothetical 
survivor fund and measure the 95%-mortality-gain-distribution 
range that would result from repeated simulations, so that is 
again what we did instead.154 
As before,155 we simulated a simple survivor fund with 
1000 male investors, 100 at each age from 65 through 74.  Each 
man invested $1000 in a survivor fund that invested in 10-year 
zero coupon bonds with a 5% yield to maturity, and we again 
used the mortality rates implied by the 2010 Social Security 
 
150.  See supra note 99 and accompanying text.  
151.  See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
152.  See supra discussion accompanying Figure 4. 
153.  See supra Part II. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. 
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area population mortality table in Appendix Table 1.  We again 
ran 1000 simulations.  This time, however, we used the age-
aligned method to reallocate the mortality losses of those who 
died during the 10-year, survivor-fund terms of those 1000 
simulations, and the results for all ten age cohorts are shown 
in Appendix Table 2B.  For the 65-year-old men, the average 
mortality-gain distribution over the simulation runs was 
$449.53 (see column 6 of Appendix Table 2B), which is again 
very close to the projected mortality gain of $448.49.156  The 
95%-mortality-gain-distribution range for these men over the 
simulation runs was from $348 to $560 (see columns 7 and 8 of 
Appendix Table 2B).  This is a much narrower range than the 
95% range from $243 to $698 that we calculated would be 
experienced by 100 65-year-old-men if the individual-cohort 
method were used.  However, it is not as narrow as the 95% 
mortality gain distribution range that they experienced in the 
simulation under the date-aligned method (from $395 to $505). 
Similarly, the age-aligned method would also result in a 
narrow 95%-yield-to-maturity range (see columns 11 and 12 of 
Appendix Table 2B).  For example, while both the age-aligned 
and individual-cohort survivor funds would produce projected 
yields to maturity for 65-year-old men of 7.58% (see column 10 
of Appendix Table 2B),157 the multi-cohort age-aligned survivor 
fund would do so with much less variance per investor.  For 
example, while the 100 65-year-old men who invested in our 
hypothetical 1000-man, multi-cohort age-aligned survivor fund 
experienced a 95%-yield-to-maturity range from 7.1% to 8.2% 
in our simulations (see columns 11 and 12 of Appendix Table 
2B), we calculated that the 100 65-year-old men who invested 
in the 100-man individual-cohort survivor fund in Part I above 
would have experienced a significantly larger 95%-yield-to-
maturity range of from 6.5% to 8.8%. 
The equivalent-individual-cohort size again shows how 
much less variance the age-aligned method produces than the 
individual-cohort method.158  And again, it is fairly easy to 
calculate the equivalent-individual-cohort size for each cohort 
 
156.  See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
157.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
158.  See supra Part IV. 
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in our age-aligned-method simulation results.  These results 
are listed in column 9 of Appendix Table 3B. This time, for the 
100 65-year-old men in our age-aligned-method simulation, the 
equivalent-individual-cohort size is 426.  Similarly, for the 100 
age-69 men, the equivalent-individual-cohort size is 761, and 
for the 100 74-year-old men it is 241.  Thus, this time the 
advantage is greatest for the 100 69-year-old men—if they were 
removed from the multi-cohort age-aligned survivor fund and 
placed in an individual-cohort survivor fund, the number of 
investors would have to increase by a factor of about 7.6 for 
those 100 65-year-old men to enjoy a 95%-mortality-gain-
distribution range as narrow as they would experience with the 
age-aligned fund.159  That would be a very large increase in the 
required number of investors.  The advantage of the age-
aligned method is smaller for ages other than 69, because men 
of those ages would be likely to have fewer competitors in their 
fair transfer-plans than the age-69 men.160 
Summing the equivalent-individual-cohort sizes for all the 
cohorts works out to a total of 5666—about 5.7 times more than 
the 1000 investors we would have in the single, multi-cohort 
age-aligned fund.161 This illustrates the case for using the age-
aligned method rather than the individual-cohort method.162 
For now, it is enough to say that the age-aligned method is 
a very interesting and fair way to design a survivor fund.  
Accordingly, investment companies that want to offer survivor 
funds should seriously consider using the age-aligned method. 
 
  
 
159.  7.61 = 761/100. 
160.  The advantage is least for the 74-year-old men—they would need 
to increase the number of investors by a factor of just 2.4 if they moved to the 
individual-cohort method. 2.41 = 241/100. 
161.  5.67 = 5666/100. 
162.  To be sure, we could do even better using the date-aligned method 
(i.e., have even less variance), but then we would have to rely on a mortality 
table that may, or may not, accurately reflect our investor population. 
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V. SURVIVOR FUNDS COULD WORK WITH ALL TYPES 
OF INVESTMENTS 
 
The simple 10-year survivor funds that we have talked 
about so far have all been invested in zero coupon bonds that 
had a 5% yield to maturity.  In this Part, we show how survivor 
funds could work with alternative investments. 
 
A. How Variations in Market Interest Rates Affect 
Survivor Fund Yields to Maturity 
 
At the outset, however, we consider how variations in the 
rate of return on the underlying assets in a survivor fund 
would affect the yield to maturity for the surviving members.  
In that regard, Table 16 builds on the survivor fund that we 
described in Part 2 above.  That is, Table 16 assumes that: 1) 
1000 65-year-old men each invested $1000 in a survivor fund 
that bought $1,000,000 worth of zero coupon bonds, and 2) that 
just 800 of the original 1000 investors survived ten years until 
the bonds matured. 
 
Table 16. How Variations in Market Interest Rates Affect 
Survivor Fund Yields 
Zero Coupon 
Bond 
Yield to 
Maturity 
Survivor 
Fund 
Yield to 
Maturity 
Increase in 
Yield to 
Maturity 
 
Percentage 
Increase in 
Yield to 
Maturity 
3% 5.32% 2.32% 
77% 
5% 7.37% 2.37% 
47% 
7% 9.41% 2.41% 
34% 
10% 12.48% 2.48% 
25% 
 
Basically, Table 16 shows how the yield to maturity of a 
survivor fund would vary depending on the yield to maturity 
for the underlying investments.  As we showed in Part 2 above, 
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for zero coupon bonds with a yield to maturity of 5% (see row 2, 
column 1 of Table 16), each of the 800 survivors would get 
around $2036, $407 more than they would have gotten if the 
$1,628,894.63 maturity value had been divided among all 1000 
original investors (or their heirs), and that translated into a 
yield to maturity of 7.37% (see row 2, column 2 of Table 16).163  
That is a 2.37% increase in the yield to maturity for the 
survivors (see row 2, column 3 of Table 16).164  Basically, 
column 3 shows that all of the yields to maturity in Column 2 
are around 2.4% larger than the yields to maturity on the 
underlying zero-coupon-bond investments in column 1. 
In that regard, however, Column 4 of Table 16 reveals an 
especially interesting relationship between the yield to 
maturity on zero coupon bonds and the yield to maturity on the 
survivor funds that hold them.  We have already seen that the 
yield to maturity for the survivor fund that invested in 5% zero 
coupon bonds was 7.37% for the survivors and that that 7.37% 
yield to maturity was 47% higher than the 5% yield to maturity 
yield to maturity on the underlying zero coupon bonds.165  
Column 4 shows that 47% result, and it also shows the 
percentage increases in yields to maturity for survivor funds 
that hold bonds with higher and lower yields to maturity.  
Looking at the entries in columns 1 and 4 of Table 16 reveals a 
very interesting pattern: the lower the yield to maturity on the 
underlying zero coupon bonds, the greater the percentage 
increase in yield to maturity for the survivor funds that holds 
them.  The implication is that the survivor funds are likely to 
be especially attractive during periods of low interest rates, due 
to the relatively large percentage increase in yield to maturity 
from investing in a survivor fund that holds low-interest-rate 
bonds as opposed to just investing directly in those low-
interest-rate bonds.166 
 
163.  See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
164.  See supra note 31. 
165.  See supra note 33. 
166.  We note, in passing, that now is, in fact, a period of historically low 
interest rates.  See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Why Very Low Interest Rates May Stick 
Around, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/upshot/why-very-low-interest-rates-may-
stick-around.html. 
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B. Survivor Funds Could Work With Almost Any 
Kind of Investment 
 
1. Survivor Funds Could Work with Almost 
Any Kind of Bond 
 
While the simple survivor funds that we have talked about 
so far were designed to invest in zero coupon bonds and to 
make a single distribution of the proceeds at maturity, a 
survivor fund could instead invest in other types of bonds. 
For example, instead of investing in a zero coupon bond, a 
survivor fund could invest in a regular coupon bond that made 
periodic interest payments which the survivor fund would 
promptly distribute.167  For example, imagine a survivor fund 
that buys a single $1,000,000 regular coupon bond with ten 
annual interest coupons attached, each paying $50,000 (i.e., 
5%).168  As in the case of the “single-payment” survivor funds 
that we have talked about so far, with a “periodic-payment” 
survivor fund, at maturity the balance in the survivor fund 
would be divided among the survivors.  The difference here is 
that with a periodic-payment survivor fund, there would also 
be periodic distributions along the way; that is, a periodic-
payment survivor fund would promptly divide and distribute 
the periodic interest payments as soon as they are received. 
Those $50,000-per-year periodic interest payments could 
be divided among all of the members of the fund, living or not.  
Alternatively, those periodic interest payments could be 
divided but only among the members who were alive on the 
date that the survivor fund received each particular interest 
payment. 
 
167.  We use the term “regular coupon bond” to mean a bond that pays 
interest periodically over the course of its life, as opposed to a zero coupon 
bond that only makes a single payment at the end of the bond term. 
168.  Of course, a bond could have interest coupons that were paid out 
semi-annually, quarterly, or even monthly.  See How does the money from the 
interest on my bond get to me?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/174.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
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We believe that most investors would prefer the first 
approach—a periodic-payment survivor fund that would: 1) 
divide the first nine years of interest coupon payments among 
all members, living or not, and 2) divide the final interest 
coupon payment and the redemption principal among those 
that survived all ten years.169  For example, our hypothetical 
10-year, $1,000,000 regular coupon bond would divide the first 
nine $50,000 interest payments equally among the 1000 
original investors (or their heirs), with each receiving $50 at 
the end of years 1 through 9. At the end of year 10, however, 
the final $50,000 interest payment and the original $1,000,000 
investment would be divided equally among those members 
who survived all ten years.  For example, if we again assume 
that only 800 of the original 1000 investors survive ten years 
(as we did in Part 2 above), each investor (or her heirs) would 
receive $50 at the end of each of the first nine years, and each 
of the 800 10-year survivors would receive $1312.50 at the end 
of year 10 (with the heirs of the 200 decedents receiving 
nothing at time 10).170  All in all, the survivors in our periodic-
payment-survivor-fund example would earn a yield to maturity 
of 6.91%,171 which turns out to be somewhat less than the 
7.37% yield to maturity earned by investors in the zero-coupon-
bond-fund example in Part 2 above.172  This slightly-lower yield 
to maturity reflects the fact that the survivors here would not 
receive any mortality gains on the first nine interest coupon 
payments, as the decedents (or their heirs) already each 
received the full $450 from those nine $50 payments.173 
 
169.  In other words, only the redemption principal and the final coupon 
payment would be at risk of forfeiture, and survivors would earn a mortality-
gain distribution only on that amount.  There would be no risk of forfeiture of 
nine coupon payments made prior to redemption time, nor would any 
mortality-gain distributions be earned on them. 
170.  $1312.50 = ($50,000 + $1,000,000)/800. 
171.  Authors’ calculations use the TIME VALUE OF MONEY CALCULATOR, 
http://www.zenwealth.com/businessfinanceonline/TVM/TVMCalculator.html 
(–$1000 present value, $50 annual payment, ten periods, $1262.50 future 
value; results in a nominal interest rate of 6.91%; $1262.50 = $1312.50 –
$50.00). 
172.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text.  
173.  $450 = 9 × $50.  In passing, we note that had we calculated the 
yield to maturity for the 200 decedents, it would have been a negative 
percentage as the $450 that each received is less than her original $1000 
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Alternatively, a periodic-payment survivor fund could 
divide each year’s interest coupon payment, but only among 
those members who were alive at the time that the fund 
received that payment.  This would increase the mortality-gain 
distributions received by the surviving members.  However, 
this alternative approach would increase the cost of operating 
the periodic-payment survivor fund, as it would require the 
fund to process death records at the end of each year, rather 
than just once at the end of the tenth year.174  We suspect that 
the additional expense of taking actual mortality experience 
into account each year would outweigh any perceived benefits 
from doing so.  Moreover, we believe that most investors would 
prefer the periodic-payment survivor fund that we first 
described—that is, one that would effectively guarantee a nine-
year income stream even if they do not live that long.175 
 
 
investments. 
174.  For example, assume that our 1000 65-year-old investors had an 
actual mortality experience that mimicked that of the 65-year-old males in 
the 2010 Social Security area population mortality table in Appendix Table 1.  
That table suggests that, of the 100,000 live male births, 80,729 would have 
made it to age 65, 79,444 of them would make it to age 66, 78,064 would 
make it to age 67 and so on until just 63,300 would make it to age 75.  A fair-
transfer plan could be used to divide the $50,000 annual interest payments—
and the $1,000,000 principal sum—among those who survived to the relevant 
ages. 
175.  Having a definite, future income stream can often make financial 
planning easier.  For example, when an investor has a home with a mortgage, 
she may want her heirs to have a definite source of income to cover the 
mortgage payments for a certain number of years, even after her death.  
Consider what happens if our investor is also a member of a periodic-
payment survivor fund that holds a coupon bond that makes annual 
distributions to all members or their heirs.  If she lived the full ten years, she 
would get $50 a year, and she would get $1312.50 at the end of year ten (her 
original $1000.00 investment plus a $312.50 mortality gain).  See supra note 
170.  If she died, for example, in year 7, her heirs would at least get the $50 
distributions at the end of years 7, 8, and 9, and those distributions would 
help them make the often difficult financial transition that accompanies the 
death of a loved one.  See, e.g., Mark Colgan, Surviving a Loss: Financial 
Planning for Widows and Widowers, AM. ASS’N. OF INDIVIDUAL INV., 
http://www.aaii.com/journal/article/surviving-a-loss-financial-planning-for-
widows-and-widowers (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
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2. Survivor Funds Could Invest in Stocks or Other 
Assets, and Fees Could Be Very Low 
 
So far, to keep it simple, we have discussed only survivor 
funds that invest in bonds, but survivor funds could easily be 
designed to invest in large cap stocks, small cap stocks, global 
equities, real estate, commodities, hedge funds, or other 
alternative investments.176  Although these survivor funds 
would provide investors with mortality-gain distributions, they 
would not, strictly speaking, be insurance products.177  
Accordingly, these survivor funds could be managed by mutual-
fund houses and discount brokers, and no money would have to 
be set aside for insurance agent commissions or insurance 
company reserves or risk-taking.178  In particular, we think 
that a survivor fund could be designed around families of 
mutual fund, like those currently offered by Fidelity,179 
Schwab,180 and Vanguard.181 
To be sure, a mutual-fund house or discount broker would 
have expenses associated with managing a survivor fund.  In 
particular, there would be the one-time, administrative 
expenses of processing death records at the end of the survivor-
fund term, but we believe that these administrative expenses 
would be very small compared to the much higher fees that 
 
176.  Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, we believe that it is 
possible to design a survivor fund that would allow members to direct their 
own investments, just as people often do today with their self-directed 401(k) 
plans and IRAs and with their mutual fund and brokerage accounts.  See, 
e.g., Chris Gay, Some 401(k) Plans Let You Take the Wheel—If You Dare, U.S. 
NEWS (June 18, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-
finance/mutual-funds/articles/2012/06/18/some-401k-plans-let-you-take-the-
wheelif-you-dare. 
177.  See, e.g., Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 818-
22.  See also infra Part VI.A. 
178.  This discussion follows Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra 
note 6, at 796-97. 
179.  See Mutual Funds, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/mutual-
funds/overview (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
180.  See Mutual Funds, CHARLES SCHWAB, 
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/investing/accounts_products/investme
nt/mutual_funds (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
181.  See Investment products, VANGUARD, 
https://investor.vanguard.com/investing/investment-products (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2016). 
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insurance companies charge for their products.182  For example, 
imagine a survivor fund that invested entirely in an S&P 500 
stock index fund.  We know that many discount brokers offer 
an S&P 500 index fund with expense ratios of 0.10% or less,183 
and we believe that the management and record-keeping 
functions associated with a survivor fund could be performed 
for no more than 0.20% of assets under management.184  That 
means that the total costs of running a survivor fund invested 
in an S&P 500 stock index fund could be less than 0.30% of 
assets under management. 
The point here is simply that it would be possible for a 
survivor fund to hold stocks or mutual funds, as opposed to 
bonds, and for it to be offered by a mutual-fund house or 
discount broker at a cost that is advantageous to investors.  
Similar logic suggests that it would also be possible to design 
low-cost survivor funds that invested in real estate, private 
equity, commodities, or other alternatives. 
 
VI. SOLVING THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF 
CREATING SURVIVOR FUNDS 
 
A. The Regulation of Survivor Funds 
Just how survivor funds would be regulated is a matter of 
some importance.  To the extent that survivor funds are viewed 
as securities, they would, of course, be subject to state and 
federal securities laws such as those administered by the 
 
182.  Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 796 (footnote 
omitted) (“For example, a recent Morningstar survey of 2037 variable 
annuities showed an average administrative fee in 2014 of 1.33% of assets 
under management, and that fee is on top of the cost of managing the 
underlying investments, which itself can easily run another 1.0%.”).  A 
“variable annuity” is an annuity that offers a range of investment options.  
Accordingly, the value of the annuity and the monthly payments will vary 
depending on the performance of the underlying investments.  See, e.g., 
Variable Annuities: What You Should Know, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 
18, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/varannty.htm. 
183.  See, e.g., Fidelity 500 Index Fund—Investor Class, FIDELITY, 
https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/summary/315911206 (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2016) (offering a 0.10% gross expense ratio; i.e., 0.10% of 
assets under management). 
184.  See, e.g., Forman & Sabin, Tontine Pensions, supra note 6, at 797. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).185  The more 
interesting question is whether survivor funds might also be 
subject to regulation by state insurance departments.186  To be 
sure, survivor funds look a lot like annuities, and, in general, 
companies offering annuities are subject to a comprehensive 
regulation by state insurance departments.187 
Like annuities, survivor funds would make payments that 
depend on mortality experience: for example, investors who die 
forfeit the balance in their account and do not receive any 
further payments or distributions.188  Unlike typical annuities, 
however, survivor funds do not make any guarantees.  In a 
survivor fund, all of the risks fall on the investors, whereas 
with a typical annuity, an insurance company bears the risk of 
making certain guaranteed payments.  Because insurance 
companies typically bear such risks, they are heavily regulated, 
and they must maintain adequate reserves.189  On the other 
hand, the investment companies (e.g., mutual-fund houses and 
discount brokers) that would sell survivor funds would bear no 
risk, and they would not need to maintain any reserves.  In our 
view, then, survivor funds are not annuities and should not be 
subjected to regulation by state insurance departments, but we 
 
185.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
186.  Both the SEC and state insurance departments regulate so-called 
variable annuities; however, the SEC does not view fixed annuities as 
securities and so does not regulate them.  Annuities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/answers/annuity.htm. 
187.  See, e.g., State Regulation of Annuities, INSURED RETIREMENT INST., 
http://www.irionline.org/government-affairs/annuities-regulation-industry-
information/state-regulation-of-annuities (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
188.  See, e.g., the discussion in Part III.  
189.  The National Association of Insurance Commissioners Model 
Standard Valuation Law generally requires insurance companies to maintain 
annuity reserves according to the Commissioners’ Annuity Reserve Method 
(CARVM).  See, e.g., Special Issues for Variable Annuities, AM. ACAD. 
ACTUARIES (1999), 
https://www.actuary.org/files/publications/Practice_Note_Special_Issues_for_
Variable_Annuities_july1999.pdf; Standard Valuation Law 820, §§ 5a, 6 
(2010), http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-820.pdf.  See also Kush Kotecha, 
Ben Yahr & James Collingwood, Statutory Reserving for Fixed Indexed 
Annuities with Guaranteed Lifetime Withdrawal Benefits, FIN. REP., at 3 
(Sept. 2012) https://www.soa.org/library/newsletters/financial-
reporter/2012/september/frn-2012-iss90-kotecha.aspx; Keith P. Sharp, 
Commissioners Annuity Reserve Valuation Method (CARVM), 7 J. ACTUARIAL 
PRAC. 107 (1999), http://www.jofap.org/documents/vol7/v7_verall.pdf. 
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can well imagine that some states might dispute that 
conclusion.  The issue could be especially important to the 
states that impose insurance premium taxes on annuities.190 
Along the same lines, we also imagine that some states 
might view survivor funds as violating their gambling laws.  
Really, however, a survivor fund is not all that different from 
several other forms of investment that are never considered to 
be gambling.  For example, property law has long recognized 
that property can be held in a joint tenancy with a right of 
survivorship.191  For example, if two people hold a joint bank 
account with a right-of-survivorship feature, while both are 
alive, they share the account, but when one dies, the survivor 
inherits the other member’s share.192  The law of intestacy has 
also long recognized the use of wills and trusts to divide assets 
among survivors.193  Here again, these legal forms often make 
the division of property contingent on survival, but no one 
thinks of them as gambling.194  The survivor funds described in 
this Article are not all that different, and they also should not 
be viewed as violating state gambling laws. 
All in all, while we readily admit that survivor funds 
combine features of an annuity and a lottery,195 we do not 
believe that survivor funds should be regulated by state 
insurance departments or barred by state gambling laws.  
 
190.  See, e.g., Darla Mercado, Beware State Premium Taxes on 
Annuities, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 18, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140618/FREE/140619928/beware-
state-premium-taxes-on-annuities; Hersh Stern, State Premium Tax, 
IMMEDIATE ANNUITIES (Oct. 15, 2016), 
https://www.immediateannuities.com/state-premium-tax/. 
191.  See, e.g., Joint Tenancy, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Joint+Tenancy (last visited Nov. 9, 2016). 
192.  Id.  
193.  See, e.g., What Happens If You Die Without a Will?, FINDLAW, 
http://files.findlaw.com/pdf/estate/estate.findlaw.com_wills_what-happens-if-
i-die-without-a-will-.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).  
194.  Still other mechanisms for designing survivor funds should be 
considered.  Cf., Druce Vertes, Tontines: Strange Name, Great Idea for 
Retirement (So Good They’re Illegal), HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:25 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/druce-vertes-cfa/tontines-strange-name-
gre_b_8227082.html (suggesting that renegade entrepreneurs should use a 
Kickstarter-like website for tontines and “dare the authorities to shut it 
down”). 
195.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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Instead, survivor funds should be regulated just like other 
securities and mutual funds. 
 
B. The Tax Treatment of Survivor Funds 
Survivor funds also raise a variety of important tax 
questions.  While virtually all income is taxed under the federal 
income tax, as more fully explained below, different tax rules 
apply to interest income, gains, and annuities.  The question 
here is just which set of rules should apply to survivor funds. 
 
1. Taxing Survivor Funds Like Other Market 
Investments 
In general, income is taxed when it is received.196  When it 
comes to interest income, however, it is usually taxed when it 
is earned.197  For example, interest in a bank savings account is 
taxed in the year that it is earned and credited to an investor’s 
savings account rather than when it is withdrawn.198  Also, 
when the interest rate on a bond is below the market interest 
rate, so-called “original issue discount” rules apply.199  These 
rules generally require the owner of the bond to report the 
 
196.  26 U.S.C. §§ 61, 451 (2012). 
197.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY. PUBLICATION NO. 17, 
TAX GUIDE 2015 62-63 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf 
[hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.].   
198.  The Tax Guide 2015 states: 
 
Constructive receipt.  You constructively receive income 
when it is credited to your account or made available to you.  
You do not need to have physical possession of it.  For 
example, you are considered to receive interest, dividends, 
or other earnings on any deposit or account in a bank, 
savings and loan, or similar financial institution, or interest 
on life insurance policy dividends left to accumulate, when 
they are credited to your account and subject to your 
withdrawal. This is true even if they are not yet entered in 
your passbook. 
Id. at 63.  
199.  See, e.g., id. at 62; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
PUBLICATION NO. 1212, GUIDE TO ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT (OID) 
INSTRUMENTS (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1212.pdf. 
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interest as it “accrues” over the term of the bond.200  For 
example, when an investor buys a zero coupon bond, she cannot 
usually wait until the end of the bond term to report the 
interest income: in most cases, a portion of the interest must be 
reported as income each year.201  Pertinent here, if an investor 
bought a 10-year zero coupon bond with a 5% yield to maturity 
for $1000 and later received $1629 at maturity,202 she would 
have to report a portion of that $629 of interest each year 
rather than reporting all $629 of interest income when it is 
actually received at the end of ten-year bond terms. 
A different set of rules applies to gains and losses that 
result from investments.  Gains on investments are typically 
taxed only when they are realized at a sale or exchange.203  For 
example, if an investor bought some stock for $1000 at time 0 
and then sold it for $1629 ten years later at time 10, the entire 
 
200.  INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 197, at 62. 
201.  See, e.g., STRIPS, TREASURY DIRECT (Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/instit/marketables/strips/strips.htm (“Income 
must be reported even though it is not received until maturity or the STRIPS 
are sold.”); U.S. Treasury Securities, RAYMOND JAMES, 
http://www.raymondjames.com/fixed_income_us_treasury_bonds.htm (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2016); Tim Plaehn, Tax on US Treasury STRIPS, ZACKS, 
http://finance.zacks.com/tax-treasury-strips-7266.html (last visited Nov. 9, 
2016). 
202.  See, e.g., supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
203.  26 U.S.C. §§ 61, 1001 (2012).  To be sure, it could make sense to tax 
many gains on an annual basis, rather than waiting until the property is sold 
(and the gain is “realized”).  For example, with respect to publicly-traded 
stocks and bonds, there is no reason why they could not be valued at the end 
of each year.  Taxpayers could then report their gains and losses on an 
annual basis, and the Treasury would collect billions more in taxes.  This is 
the so-called “mark-to-market” approach to taxing accrued gains.  See, e.g., 
David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation, 109 TAX 
NOTES 1047 (2005); Nohel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Colloquium 
on Capital Gains: The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 
(1993); Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and 
Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817 (1990); David J. Shakow, Taxation 
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 
(1986).  As for nonpublicly-traded assets, a deemed mark-to-market regime 
could be used to “impose a tax that would leave the taxpayer with the after-
tax amount that would have resulted had the asset appreciated constantly at 
the pre-tax yield, the taxpayer had been taxed annually on a mark-to-market 
basis, and the taxpayer had sold enough of the asset to pay the tax.”  David S. 
Miller, A Comprehensive Mark-to-Market Tax for the 0.1% Wealthiest and 
Highest-Earning Taxpayers, 4 (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2710738. 
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$629 of gain would be reported in year 10.  Moreover, as stock 
is usually a “capital asset,” the gain would be taxed at a 
reduced “capital gains” rate.204  On the other hand, losses are 
usually deductible.205  For example, if an investor bought some 
stock for $1000 at time 0 and sold if for $400 ten years later, 
she could typically deduct a $600 capital loss in year 10.206  
Similarly, if her investment became worthless at some point, 
say, because the underlying company went out of business, she 
could probably deduct all $1000 in the year her stock became 
worthless.207 
All in all, the simplest approach might be to tax survivor 
funds like most other investments in which there are gains and 
losses.  For example, if an individual invested $1000 in a 
survivor fund and ten years later collected $2036, she would 
have no income until year 10, and then she would have $1036 
of income in Year 10.  On the other hand, if she died before 
year 10 and so forfeited her $1000 survivor-fund investment, 
she could be allowed to deduct her $1000 loss in the year of her 
death.208  Moreover, survivor funds could be treated as capital 
assets, in which case, the favorable capital gains rates would 
apply to the gains, while the usual limitations on capital losses 
would apply to any losses.209 
On the other hand, a powerful argument can be made that 
survivor funds should instead be taxed like annuities.  The 
income tax system generally provides fairly favorable tax 
treatment for investments in annuities.210  Although the value 
of an annuity investment grows over time, no tax is imposed 
until annuity distributions commence.  In short, there is no tax 
on the so-called “inside buildup” until the “annuity starting 
 
204.  26 U.S.C. §§ 1(h), 1221 (2012). 
205.  26 U.S.C. §§ 165(a)-(c), (2)(f); 1001(a); 1211(b) (2012). 
206.  For individuals, capital losses are typically deductible to the extent 
of capital gains, plus as much as another $3000 of capital losses each year.  
See 26 U.S.C. § 1211(b). 
207.  See 26 U.S.C. § 165(g) (2012). 
208.  As her investment was $1000, her “basis” for computing her loss 
would be $1000.  See 26 U.S.C. § 1012. 
209.  See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
210.  See 26 U.S.C. § 72 (2012).  See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T 
OF TREASURY, PUBLICATION NO. 575, Pension and Annuity Income (2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf. 
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date.”211 Even then, the annuitant can exclude a fraction of 
each benefit payment from income.  That fraction (the 
“exclusion ratio”) is based on the amount of premiums or other 
after-tax contributions made by the individual.212  The 
exclusion ratio enables the individual to recover her own after-
tax contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the remaining 
portion of benefits which represents income.  For example, if an 
individual invested $1000 in an annuity and ten years later 
received an annuity distribution of $2036, she would have no 
income until year 10, and then she would have $1036 of income 
in Year 10.  That $1036 would be ordinary income, not eligible 
for preferential capital gains rates.213 
Like investors in annuities, surviving investors in survivor 
funds would receive both mortality gains and interest.214  For 
example, in Part 2 above, we assumed that 1000 65-year-old 
men each invested $1000 in a 10-year survivor fund that 
invested in a 10-year zero coupon bond with a 5% yield to 
maturity, and we further assumed that 800 of them made it to 
age 75—that is, 200 died.  As a result, each of the 800 survivors 
got $2036 on their $1000 investments, rather than just $1629.  
In effect, each survivor got $629 in interest and got a mortality 
gain of $407.  Theoretically, it might make sense to tax the 
interest income as it is earned (applying the original issue 
discount rules), while the mortality gain could instead be taxed 
in year 10, perhaps even at a reduced rate as a capital gain.  
On the other hand, survivor funds are so much like annuities 
that we believe that they should probably be taxed like 
annuities.  That is, income taxation should be deferred until 
distributions are made at the end of the survivor-fund term. 
To be sure, elsewhere, one of us (Forman) has argued for 
repeal of the favorable tax treatment of annuities;215 however, 
 
211.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 72(c)(4) (2012); The Tax Expenditure for Life 
Insurance Inside Buildup, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX 
ANALYSIS  (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Life-Insurance-Inside-Buildup.pdf.  
212.  See 26 U.S.C. § 72(b) (2012). 
213.  On the other hand, if you lose money on an annuity, the capital 
loss limitation rules in 26 U.S.C. § 1211(b) do not apply. 
214.  On the other hand, investors in survivor funds who die before the 
end receive nothing. 
215.  Jonathan B. Forman, Reconsidering the Tax Treatment of Pensions 
80https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/7
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as long as the federal tax system provides favorable tax 
treatment for annuities, we see no reason why these same rules 
should not also be applied to survivor funds.216 
 
2. The Tax Treatment of Companies 
Administering Survivor Funds 
The tax treatment of the companies selling survivor funds 
is also relevant.  For income tax purposes, insurance companies 
typically report all the premiums and other income that they 
receive and deduct their payouts.217  Trusts also include the 
income that they receive, but they can typically deduct the 
amounts that they distribute to beneficiaries.218  Similar rules 
apply to mutual fund companies.219  All of this suggests, that 
survivor funds may present some important tax issues for the 
companies that sell them.  If those companies postpone making 
distributions, say, for the full 10-year term of a survivor fund, 
then presumably, the government will want to tax those 
companies on the income from the underlying investments as 
that income is earned and delay the deduction for distributions 
until those companies actually make those distributions. 
 
and Annuities, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 221, 232-33 (2014).   
216.  To be sure, an anti-abuse rule might be needed to prevent survivor 
funds from becoming a tool to avoid the original issue discount rules.  Today, 
if an individual buys a zero coupon bond, the original issue discount rules 
force her to report the interest on that bond as it is earned.  On the other 
hand, if she instead invests in a survivor fund that invests in zero coupon 
bonds and the annuity tax rules were to apply, she would not report any 
income until the end of the survivor-fund term.  In effect, she would have 
avoided the imputed interest rules.  Accordingly, an anti-abuse rule might 
tax her on that imputed interest unless there is a meaningful risk that she 
would not live until the end of the survivor-fund term.  For example, 65-year-
olds have a meaningful risk of dying before age 75 (21.59%); on the other 
hand, however, 8-year-olds do not have a meaningful risk of dying before age 
18 (0.27%). See supra notes 54 & 92. 
217.  See 26 U.S.C. § 831 et seq. 
218.  See, e.g., Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes - Facts (Section II): 
Basic Trust Taxation Rules, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Abusive-
Trust-Tax-Evasion-Schemes-Facts-Section-II. 
219.  See, e.g., Andriy Blokhin, Do mutual fund companies pay taxes?, 
INVESTOPEDIA, (Sept. 11, 2015, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/091115/do-mutual-fund-companies-
pay-taxes.asp. 
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All in all, the tax rules affecting the companies selling 
survivor funds and the tax rules affecting the investors who 
buy them will have an impact on their after-tax rate of return.  
Whatever those tax rules are, however, we are confident that 
survivor funds would be very attractive investment vehicles, 
and we look forward to helping the market develop. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we showed how the survivor principle could 
be used to create survivor funds that only make payments to 
those who survive for a specified number of years.  For 
example, instead of just investing in 10-year zero coupon bonds 
and dividing the proceeds among the investors at the end of 10 
years, a survivor fund would invest in those 10-year zero 
coupon bonds but divide the proceeds only among those who 
survived the full ten years.  We also showed how survivor 
funds could be designed to invest in stocks or mutual funds 
instead of bonds. 
This Article also explained several methods for designing 
survivor funds, including the individual-cohort method, the 
date-aligned method, and the age-aligned method.  All three of 
these methods would provide fair bets for all investors, but only 
the age-aligned and date-aligned methods are practical, as 
these methods could easily accommodate real-world investors 
with different ages, genders, and investment levels (while the 
individual-cohort method could not). 
All in all, survivor funds would be very attractive 
investments because the survivors would get significantly 
greater returns on their investments, while the decedents, for 
obvious reasons, would not care.  The origins of investing on 
Wall Street date back to around 1793 when the Tontine Coffee 
House was established there as a meeting place for 
stockbrokers.220  We think survivor funds will also find a new 
home on Wall Street—with today’s investment companies and 
mutual fund houses. 
  
 
220. See, e.g., Tontine Coffee House, AARON BURR ASS’N, 
http://www.aaronburrassociation.org/tontine.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2016).  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1. Period Life Table, 2010.221 
Age 
(i) 
Male Female 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
 
No. of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
No. 
of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
      
0 0.006680 100,00
0 
76.10 0.005562 100,000 80.94 
1 0.000436 99,332 75.62 0.000396 99,444 80.39 
2 0.000304 99,289 74.65 0.000214 99,404 79.43 
3 0.000232 99,259 73.67 0.000162 99,383 78.44 
4 0.000172 99,235 72.69 0.000132 99,367 77.46 
5 0.000155 99,218 71.70 0.000117 99,354 76.47 
6 0.000143 99,203 70.71 0.000106 99,342 75.47 
7 0.000131 99,189 69.72 0.000099 99,332 74.48 
8 0.000115 99,176 68.73 0.000093 99,322 73.49 
9 0.000096 99,164 67.74 0.000090 99,313 72.50 
10 0.000082 99,155 66.74 0.000090 99,304 71.50 
11 0.000086 99,147 65.75 0.000096 99,295 70.51 
12 0.000125 99,138 64.76 0.000111 99,285 69.52 
13 0.000205 99,126 63.76 0.000137 99,274 68.52 
14 0.000319 99,106 62.78 0.000170 99,261 67.53 
15 0.000441 99,074 61.80 0.000207 99,244 66.54 
16 0.000562 99,030 60.82 0.000245 99,223 65.56 
17 0.000690 98,975 59.86 0.000282 99,199 64.57 
18 0.000820 98,906 58.90 0.000318 99,171 63.59 
19 0.000949 98,825 57.95 0.000352 99,139 62.61 
20 0.001085 98,731 57.00 0.000388 99,105 61.63 
21 0.001213 98,624 56.06 0.000423 99,066 60.66 
22 0.001304 98,505 55.13 0.000454 99,024 59.68 
23 0.001345 98,376 54.20 0.000476 98,979 58.71 
24 0.001350 98,244 53.27 0.000494 98,932 57.74 
25 0.001342 98,111 52.34 0.000511 98,883 56.77 
26 0.001340 97,980 51.41 0.000531 98,833 55.79 
27 0.001342 97,848 50.48 0.000553 98,780 54.82 
28 0.001356 97,717 49.55 0.000579 98,726 53.85 
29 0.001380 97,584 48.62 0.000608 98,668 52.88 
30 0.001408 97,450 47.68 0.000641 98,608 51.92 
31 0.001435 97,313 46.75 0.000677 98,545 50.95 
32 0.001466 97,173 45.82 0.000719 98,479 49.98 
33 0.001499 97,031 44.88 0.000765 98,408 49.02 
34 0.001539 96,885 43.95 0.000818 98,332 48.06 
 
221.  Bye, supra note 52. 
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Age 
(i) 
Male Female 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
 
No. of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
No. 
of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
35 0.001592 96,736 43.02 0.000879 98,252 47.10 
36 0.001660 96,582 42.08 0.000948 98,166 46.14 
37 0.001741 96,422 41.15 0.001022 98,073 45.18 
38 0.001837 96,254 40.22 0.001100 97,972 44.23 
39 0.001953 96,077 39.30 0.001185 97,865 43.27 
40 0.002084 95,889 38.37 0.001279 97,749 42.32 
41 0.002241 95,689 37.45 0.001387 97,624 41.38 
42 0.002439 95,475 36.53 0.001518 97,488 40.43 
43 0.002686 95,242 35.62 0.001676 97,340 39.50 
44 0.002975 94,986 34.72 0.001858 97,177 38.56 
45 0.003297 94,704 33.82 0.002055 96,997 37.63 
46 0.003639 94,392 32.93 0.002262 96,797 36.71 
47 0.003997 94,048 32.05 0.002480 96,578 35.79 
48 0.004366 93,672 31.17 0.002709 96,339 34.88 
49 0.004750 93,263 30.31 0.002947 96,078 33.97 
50 0.005156 92,820 29.45 0.003209 95,795 33.07 
51 0.005596 92,342 28.60 0.003484 95,487 32.18 
52 0.006078 91,825 27.76 0.003751 95,155 31.29 
53 0.006605 91,267 26.93 0.004000 94,798 30.40 
54 0.007174 90,664 26.10 0.004246 94,418 29.52 
55 0.007805 90,013 25.29 0.004520 94,017 28.65 
56 0.008464 89,311 24.48 0.004836 93,593 27.77 
57 0.009095 88,555 23.69 0.005185 93,140 26.91 
58 0.009676 87,750 22.90 0.005570 92,657 26.04 
59 0.010245 86,901 22.12 0.006001 92,141 25.19 
60 0.010865 86,010 21.34 0.006489 91,588 24.34 
61 0.011592 85,076 20.57 0.007046 90,994 23.49 
62 0.012444 84,090 19.81 0.007686 90,352 22.65 
63 0.013451 83,043 19.05 0.008419 89,658 21.83 
64 0.014608 81,926 18.30 0.009249 88,903 21.01 
65 0.015927 80,729 17.57 0.010201 88,081 20.20 
66 0.017370 79,444 16.84 0.011255 87,182 19.40 
67 0.018895 78,064 16.13 0.012372 86,201 18.62 
68 0.020484 76,589 15.43 0.013538 85,135 17.84 
69 0.022191 75,020 14.75 0.014793 83,982 17.08 
70 0.024139 73,355 14.07 0.016233 82,740 16.33 
71 0.026364 71,584 13.40 0.017882 81,397 15.59 
72 0.028808 69,697 12.75 0.019693 79,941 14.87 
73 0.031480 67,689 12.12 0.021671 78,367 14.16 
74 0.034442 65,558 11.49 0.023866 76,669 13.46 
75 0.037855 63,300 10.89 0.026437 74,839 12.77 
76 0.041725 60,904 10.30 0.029368 72,860 12.11 
77 0.045932 58,363 9.72 0.032519 70,721 11.46 
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Age 
(i) 
Male Female 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
 
No. of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
No. 
of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
78 0.050469 55,682 9.17 0.035870 68,421 10.83 
79 0.055465 52,872 8.63 0.039555 65,967 10.21 
80 0.061179 49,939 8.10 0.043828 63,357 9.61 
81 0.067698 46,884 7.60 0.048808 60,580 9.03 
82 0.074923 43,710 7.11 0.054434 57,624 8.47 
83 0.082891 40,435 6.65 0.060762 54,487 7.93 
84 0.091725 37,084 6.21 0.067889 51,176 7.41 
85 0.101575 33,682 5.78 0.075926 47,702 6.91 
86 0.112568 30,261 5.38 0.084968 44,080 6.44 
87 0.124795 26,854 5.00 0.095093 40,335 5.99 
88 0.138305 23,503 4.64 0.106352 36,499 5.56 
89 0.153107 20,253 4.30 0.118777 32,617 5.17 
90 0.169195 17,152 3.99 0.132384 28,743 4.80 
91 0.186543 14,250 3.70 0.147181 24,938 4.45 
92 0.205115 11,592 3.44 0.163161 21,268 4.13 
93 0.224867 9,214 3.20 0.180314 17,798 3.84 
94 0.245744 7,142 2.98 0.198615 14,588 3.58 
95 0.266454 5,387 2.79 0.217125 11,691 3.34 
96 0.286625 3,952 2.62 0.235558 9,153 3.13 
97 0.305869 2,819 2.47 0.253602 6,997 2.94 
98 0.323783 1,957 2.34 0.270923 5,222 2.76 
99 0.339972 1,323 2.22 0.287178 3,807 2.60 
100 0.356971 873 2.10 0.304409 2,714 2.45 
101 0.374819 562 1.99 0.322673 1,888 2.31 
102 0.393560 351 1.88 0.342033 1,279 2.17 
103 0.413238 213 1.78 0.362555 841 2.03 
104 0.433900 125 1.68 0.384309 536 1.91 
105 0.455595 71 1.59 0.407367 330 1.79 
106 0.478375 39 1.50 0.431809 196 1.67 
107 0.502293 20 1.41 0.457718 111 1.56 
108 0.527408 10 1.32 0.485181 60 1.45 
109 0.553778 5 1.24 0.514292 31 1.35 
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Age 
(i) 
Male Female 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
 
No. of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
Death 
Probability 
(qi) 
No. 
of 
Lives 
(ni) 
Life 
Expectancy 
(li) 
110 0.581467 2 1.17 0.545149 15 1.26 
111 0.610541 1 1.09 0.577858 7 1.17 
112 0.641068 0 1.02 0.612530 3 1.08 
113 0.673121 0 0.95 0.649282 1 1.00 
114 0.706777 0 0.89 0.688238 0 0.92 
115 0.742116 0 0.83 0.729533 0 0.84 
116 0.779222 0 0.77 0.773305 0 0.77 
117 0.818183 0 0.71 0.818183 0 0.71 
118 0.859092 0 0.66 0.859092 0 0.66 
119 0.902047 0 0.60 0.902047 0 0.60 
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Appendix Table 3. Mortality Rates for Males, Aged 50-80.222 
Age 
(i) 
Social Security 
Universe, 2010 
(qi) 
Society of Actuaries, RP-2014 
NAIC 2012 
(qi) Employee (qi) 
Healthy 
Annuitant 
(qi) 
Disabled 
Retiree 
(qi) 
50 0.005156 0.001686 0.004064 0.020395 0.002057 
51 0.005596 0.001871 0.004384 0.021016 0.002302 
52 0.006078 0.002072 0.004709 0.021621 0.002545 
53 0.006605 0.002289 0.005042 0.022210 0.002779 
54 0.007174 0.002527 0.005384 0.022791 0.003011 
55 0.007805 0.002788 0.005735 0.023369 0.003254 
56 0.008464 0.003079 0.006099 0.023953 0.003529 
57 0.009095 0.003407 0.006478 0.024557 0.003845 
58 0.009676 0.003779 0.006877 0.025190 0.004213 
59 0.010245 0.004204 0.007305 0.025868 0.004631 
60 0.010865 0.004688 0.007771 0.026604 0.005096 
61 0.011592 0.005240 0.008284 0.027414 0.005614 
62 0.012444 0.005867 0.008854 0.028312 0.006169 
63 0.013451 0.006577 0.009492 0.029314 0.006759 
64 0.014608 0.007377 0.010209 0.030433 0.007398 
65 0.015927 0.008277 0.011013 0.031685 0.008106 
66 0.017370 0.009175 0.011916 0.033081 0.008548 
67 0.018895 0.010171 0.012930 0.034633 0.009076 
68 0.020484 0.011275 0.014067 0.036353 0.009708 
69 0.022191 0.012498 0.015342 0.038253 0.010463 
70 0.024139 0.013854 0.016769 0.040346 0.011357 
71 0.026364 0.015357 0.018363 0.042647 0.012418 
72 0.028808 0.017023 0.020141 0.045170 0.013675 
73 0.031480 0.018870 0.022127 0.047935 0.015150 
74 0.034442 0.020918 0.024345 0.050965 0.016860 
75 0.037855 0.023188 0.026826 0.054287 0.018815 
76 0.041725 0.025704 0.029608 0.057934 0.021031 
77 0.045932 0.028493 0.032735 0.061945 0.023540 
78 0.050469 0.031585 0.036258 0.066363 0.026375 
79 0.055465 0.035012 0.040232 0.071235 0.029572 
80 0.061179 0.038811 0.044722 0.076616 0.033234 
 
 
 
222 Bye, supra note 52; RP-2014 Rates; Total Dataset, supra note 138; NAIC 
Model Rule, supra note 139, at Appendix II. 
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